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Should Students Have Constitutional
Rights? Keeping Order in the
Public Schools
Anne Proffitt Dupre*
This Article focuses on how the Supreme Court's conception of the public
school as either an institution of social reproduction or reconstruction, a con-
flict Professor Dupre maintains is deeply rooted in intellectual history, has
affected the power that public schools have been afforded in matters of disci-
pline and order. Professor Dupre argues that the Court-by allowing the re-
construction model to influence its opinion for almost thirty years-paved the
way for the decline in school order and educational quality. Although Profes-
sor Dupre contends that the Court's recent repudiation of the reconstruction
model in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton is a welcome and heartening
revelation for those who would revitalize the public school as a force of social
integration, she suggests further refinements to the Court's new approach
based on the writings of constitutional framer James Wilson, contemporary
ethicist David Luban, and Justice John M. Harlan.
Table of Contents
Introduction ............................................................. 50
I. School Order and the Constitution ................................ 54
A. The Supreme Court's Jurisprudence of Discipline and Order .... 54
1. The First Amendment .................................... 54
2. The Fourth Amendment .................................. 56
3. The Fourteenth Amendment .............................. 57
B. The School Power Continuum ................................. 59
II. Two Models of School Power ..................................... 64
A. Social Reconstruction and Social Reproduction ................. 64
1. Social Reconstruction ..................................... 65
2. Social Reproduction ...................................... 67
B. The Court and the Models of School Power .................... 70
1. In Loco Parentis .......................................... 70
2. Tinker and the Reconstruction Model ...................... 72
3. In the Shade of Tinker: The Reconstruction Motif .......... 75
4. Out of the Shade of Tinker. A New School Power Paradigm. 86
III. The Nature of School Power: The Future .......................... 93
A. The Strength of Acton ........................................ 93
B. Refining the School Power Analysis ........................... 101
Conclusion .............................................................. 104
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law; B.A. University of
Rhode Island; J.D. University of Georgia. I would like to thank Patricia Daugherty, John Day-
ton, William Dupre, Thomas Eaton, Marci Hamilton, Edward Larson, Brenda Manning, Richard
Nagareda, Ruth Nagareda, Michael Wells, and Rebecca White for their helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this Article and Kimberly Frye and Lawrence Humphrey for their valuable re-
search assistance. The author was employed as a public school teacher before entering law
school. A grant from the University of Georgia School of Law provided financial support for
this Article.
November 1996 Vol. 65 No. 1
HeinOnline -- 65 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.  49 1996-1997
The George Washington Law Review
Introduction
"It is almost impossible for an American of the 1990s to imagine the
respect authority was [granted in the 1930s], whether it was held by a presi-
dent or a teacher or a policeman."' Once a society that generally respected
the authority of teachers, deferred to their judgment, and trusted them to act
in the best interest of school children, we now accept defiance, disrespect,
and disorder as daily occurrences in many of our public schools. The lack of
order and discipline in many schools2 makes it nearly impossible for students
to receive a serious education.
Constitutional doctrine has made it more difficult for the public schools
to reclaim the order and discipline necessary to educate students. Although
the deterioration of other institutions that are important to the child-family,
religion, and community-has certainly played a part in this tragedy,3 the
Supreme Court must also accept responsibility for intervening in the day-to-
day running of our nation's public schools. Researchers have inferred, not
surprisingly, that the "adversarial and legalistic character of urban public
schools"-qualities attributable to the Court's school jurisprudence of recent
years-and the corresponding unwillingness of teachers to maintain order
have affected educational quality.4 As other institutions were crumbling, the
Court, instead of shoring up the public school as an institution, cleared the
way for its decline. The Court's analysis in the school power cases has exac-
erbated the loss of respect, deference, and trust in the public school as an
institution and has wrongly insinuated that these qualities are incompatible
1 Jonathan Yardley, We Have Met the Future and It Is Us, WASH. POST, June 11, 1995, at 3
(Book World) (reviewing DAVID GELERNTER, 1939: Tim Losr WORLD OF THE FAIR (1995)).
2 In a recent poll by the education association Phi Delta Kappa, the public judged "lack
of discipline" to be the biggest problem faced by public schools. Stanley M. Elam & Lowell C.
Rose, Of the Public's Attitudes Toward the Public Schools, Pri DELTA KAPPAN, Sept. 1995, at 41,
52. Lack of discipline consistently has been cited as the biggest problem for public schools,
together with "fighting/violence/gangs" and "drug abuse," id., both of which are subsets of disci-
pline. "Lack of respect for teachers, authority, students" was also cited as a significant problem,
id, and is another subset of school discipline.
3 See generally MARE WIN, CHILDREN WITHOuT CHILDHOOD (1983) (exploring cul-
tural changes that have resulted in a shortened period of nurture and protection for children).
Of course, with the disintegration of these institutions, more responsibility fell on the public
school. Expected to provide the community with athletic and cultural recreation and the stu-
dents with breakfast, lunch, and after-school care, the school has been asked to shoulder many of
the functions that have previously been the province of other institutions.
4 Bruce C. Hafen, Developing Student Expression Through Institutional Authority: Public
Schools as Mediating Structures, 48 Omio ST. L.J. 663,685-86 (1987) (quoting Gerald Grant, The
Character of Education and the Education of Character, AM. EDUC., Jan./Feb. 1982, at 37, 41)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Betsy Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship: The
Conflict Between Authority and Individual Rights in the Public School, 95 YALE L.J. 1647, 1650-
51 (1986) (noting growing concern that "legalization" in schools has hindered schools from per-
forming their educational mission). For two additional perspectives on how rights affect society,
compare MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DIs-
COURSE (1991) (arguing that an overly individualistic, simplistic, and absolutist view of rights can
impede efforts to develop a strong social fabric), with Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An
Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE LJ. 1860 (1987) (positing that rights arguments reconfirm
community).
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with liberty.5 Indeed, order in the schools increasingly has become "what will
stand up in court."'6
A recent development in Charlotte, North Carolina presents a stunning
example of how deeply public schools have been chilled in maintaining order.
Charlotte school officials decided that improper behavior like shouting out in
class, hitting others in class, walking around the room while a lesson is being
taught, and disrupting others will no longer be tolerated. Violators are sent
to an alternative school called a "management school." Although Charlotte
must be commended for its attempt to maintain an environment in which
serious learning can take place, it is no less than astounding that discipline in
our public schools is in such a sorry state that the decision to maintain such a
minimal standard of order is so newsworthy that it becomes a feature on a
major national news show.7
A broad social consensus now exists that there is a crisis of order in the
public schools. President Clinton's endorsement of school uniforms to put
"discipline and learning back in... schools"8 is only one reflection of the
bipartisan recognition of the significance of order in the public schools. Par-
ents of diverse social and economic backgrounds-white and black, wealthy
and middle class-are removing their children from public schools due to
concerns about order and safety.9 Thus, the undervaluing of order has the
potential to undermine the historic mission of the public school institution as
a force of social integration.
The chaos that has overtaken many of our public schools did not happen
overnight. Serious discipline problems usually do not arise spontaneously in
a school. They creep in as children realize that schools are unwilling or un-
able to take disciplinary action for lesser conduct. 10 Each time that miscon-
5 See Hafen, supra note 4, at 681 (maintaining that the Supreme Court's children's rights
decisions created a basic, though symbolic, shift in perceptions about the relationship between
children and public school authorities); see also Theodore F. Denno, Mary Beth Tinker Takes the
Constitution to School, 38 FORDHAM L. Rnv. 35, 58 (1969) (contending that Supreme Court
cases indicate that "traditional deference paid to education officials... is at an explicit end").
6 Hafen, supra note 4, at 686 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
7 See Day One: School Discipline (ABC television broadcast, June 1, 1995). Of course,
the decision to move a student out of the classroom can be fraught with legal difficulties. See,
&g., Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 313, 323 (1988) (holding that, under a federal statute, a school
does not have power to exclude unilaterally a disabled student from the classroom after the
student kicked out a school window and choked another child, leaving abrasions); Goss v. Lo-
pez, 419 U.S. 565, 573-74, 581 (1975) (holding that because public education is a property right
protected by due process, a school may not suspend a disruptive and disobedient student without
notice and hearing).
8 Alison Mitchell, Clinton WillAdvise Schools on Uniforms, N.Y. Trams, Feb. 25, 1996, at
24 (describing how "President Clinton instructed the Federal Education Department... to dis-
tribute manuals to the nation's... school districts advising them how they can legally enforce a
school uniform policy").
9 See Leslie Brody, Overlooked in the Debate: Minorities That Opt for Private Schools,
THE RECORD, N. N.J., Nov. 12, 1995, at Al; Jonathan Kaufman, Suburban Parents Shun Many
Public Schools, Even the Good Ones, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 1996, at Al.
10 There is a telling connection between the problems in the public schools and the
problems in many neighborhoods. Political scientist James Q. Wilson and criminologist George
Kelling first introduced the "broken windows" theory in 1982. They contended that even seem-
ingly benign social misbehavior like graffiti or a window left unfixed signalled to a neighbor-
1996]
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duct by an individual student went unquestioned because the teacher or
principal was afraid that it did not meet the "substantial disruption" standard
set forth by the Supreme Court," we took one more step toward the turmoil
that exists in the public school community today. The guerilla tactics of these
institutional saboteurs have been "condoned, if not honored, by a host of
acerbic external critics,"'12 some of whom I contend have been Justices on the
Supreme Court. There are other factors that have contributed to the current
state of the public school institution, but I have little doubt that the ethos the
Court has created has discouraged teachers over time in their efforts to main-
tain order.
Recently, however, the Supreme Court changed course in a way that
could help public schools become a place where serious learning can and will
take place. The Court made front-page headlines with its decision in
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,13 in which a divided Court upheld ran-
dom drug testing for student athletes.14 This was the first time the Court has
allowed school officials to search students randomly, without suspicion of
wrongdoing. Although the decision has been hailed by many,15 the Court has
also been accused of writing an opinion that "soils the Constitution.' 16
In the aftermath of Acton, much of the commentary has focused on Ac-
ton's impact on the Fourth Amendment rights of public school students.17
hood's citizens that the social order had broken down which, in turn, led to more and more
serious crime. See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, THE ATLAirrC,
Mar. 1982, at 29,31-32; see also WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DisoRDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE
SPIRAL Op DECAY IN AM UCAN NEIGHBORHOODS (1990). The crucial battles to save either a
neighborhood or a school must be fought over minor social infractions. See John Leo, Fighting
for Our Public Spaces, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Feb. 3,1992, at 18. When disorderly behavior
is left unchallenged, the signal is given that no one cares, and the disorder escalates. See James
Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Making Neighborhoods Safe, THE ATLANTImC, Feb. 1989, at 46,
48.
11 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
12 David L. Kirp, Proceduralism and Bureaucracy: Due Process in the School Setting, 28
STAN. L. REv. 841, 857 (1976). Professor Kirp has called the forms of disturbances like insubor-
dination and acting out "institutional sabotage" and has called student disrupters the "guerrilla
troops in a larger political battle for control of the enterprise." l
13 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
14 See id. at 2396.
15 See, e.g., Paul M. Barrett, Court Says Schools Can Do Random Drug Tests, WALL ST. J.,
June 27, 1995, at B1 (quoting then Clinton Administration "drug czar" Lee Brown, who de-
scribed the ruling as "a major victory for kids"); Mark Walsh & Laura Miller, Court Upholds
Drug Tests for Student Athletes, EDUC. WL., July 12, 1995, at 1, 23 (stating that many school
officials were pleased to have another tool to fight drug abuse in schools). Indeed, many stu-
dents agreed. See, e.g., Paula Yoo, Test Cases: Youths Think Drug Checks Are OK, But Others
Fear the Consequences of a Pass/Fail Mentality, DET. NEWS, June 30, 1995, at 1E (citing student
support for drug tests).
16 Tracey Maclin, Court Is Off Base on Student Drug Tests, NEWSDAY, Aug. 9, 1995, at
A32; see also Walsh & Miller, supra note 15, at 23 (quoting an ACLU legal director's claim that
Acton "sends a strong message to all young people that they are merely second-class citizens
under the Fourth Amendment") (internal quotation marks omitted).
17 See, e.g., Andrew T. Pittman & Mark R. Slough, Commentary, Drug Testing of High
School Student Athletes After Vernonia, 104 EDUC. L. REP. 15, 17 (West 1995); Michael Hallam,
Note, A Casualty of the "War on Drugs". Mandatory, Suspicionless Drug Testing of Student Ath-
letes in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 74 N.C. L. REv. 833, 834-35 (1996) (discussing
[Vol 65:49
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This Article analyzes Acton from a different and, in my view, more illuminat-
ing perspective. Rather than discuss how Acton fits into existing Fourth
Amendment doctrine, I examine how Acton fits into the Court's conception
of school power. In Part I, I argue that-from the time the Court first de-
cided to intervene in the public schools in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District's-it has been the Court's conception of the pub-
lic school as an institution and the power it should be afforded that has driven
its analysis of student rights. In Part II, I set forth two models of school
power: social reproduction and social reconstruction. In the social recon-
struction model, the school is viewed as an institution that needs power only
to facilitate the students in their attempts to construct a new social order. In
contrast, in the social reproduction model, the school must have the power to
inculcate students with society's traditions and values so that the students will
have the ability as adults to participate knowledgeably in democratic institu-
tions. I reveal in this section how the conflict between these two models is
deeply rooted in American intellectual history, and I illustrate how the Court
has vacillated between them.' 9 In Part III, I explain that, for those who are
serious about the kind of public school reform that would revive confidence
in the public school as an institution, Acton's repudiation of the reconstruc-
tion model is a step in the right direction. To the extent that Acton's defini-
tion of the nature of school power-as that of a custodian or guardian-
allows school officials to predict with more certainty the extent to which spe-
cific efforts to keep order are permissible, it will also enhance the ability of
the public school to provide each student with a serious education. Finally, I
suggest that further study is needed to refine the construct that the Acton
Court set forth regarding the nature of school power. To that end, I recom-
mend that we return to a theory that has been buried for over twenty-five
years in Justice Harlan's dissent in Tinker, for within that dissent is the seed
of another model of school power. Instead of the guardian-ward construct
established by the Acton Court, I suggest that an attorneyship model may
better express the power relationship between student and school.
whether Acton would support a school-wide drug testing program); Kevin C. Newsom, Recent
Development, Suspicionless Drug Testing and the Fourth Amendment, Vernonia School District
47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct 2386 (1995), 19 HAv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 209 (1995); Leslie G. Peters,
Note, Message in a Bottle: Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 29 CREIGHTON L. REv. 861,
861 (1996); Constitutional Law Conference Probes Impact of Supreme Court's 1994-95 Term, 64
U.S.L.W. 2240, 2245 (Oct. 24, 1995) (providing a synopsis of Yale Kamisar's analysis of Acton
provided during U.S. Law Week's Constitutional Law Conference held Sept. 8-9,1995, in Wash-
ington, D.C.) [hereinafter Kanisar]. Some commentators have contended that school adminis-
trators and courts will read Acton to allow broader school searches, perhaps of the entire student
body, or different kinds of searches, perhaps canine sniffs or searches of bookbags. See, e.g., Ira
Mickenberg, Court Settles on Narrower View of Fourth Amendment, NAT'L L.J., July 31, 1995, at
C8 (asserting that nothing in Acton prevents its reasoning from being applied to other student
groups or to all students). Other commentators have cautioned school districts to tread carefully
if they plan to expand the scope of student searches beyond athletes. See Walsh & Miller, supra
note 15, at 23 (quoting Gwendolyn H. Gregory, Deputy General Counsel of the National School
Boards Association).
18 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
19 For a more thorough discussion of the reconstruction and reproduction models, see in-
fra notes 111-141 and accompanying text.
1996]
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L School Order and the Constitution
In the last half of the twentieth century the Supreme Court has consid-
ered school discipline and order in various doctrinal contexts, including the
First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Part A, I examine how the Court has dealt with the relationship between
public school and student in these different contexts, and in Part B, I point
out the unacknowledged common thread that runs through each of these
opinions.
A. The Supreme Court's Jurisprudence of Discipline and Order
1. The First Amendment
I begin with the Court's attempt to address student expression in the
school setting and Tinker, the watershed opinion that announced that stu-
dents do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expres-
sion at the schoolhouse gate. '20 In 1965 a group of adults, with their
children, decided to wear black armbands to publicize their opposition to the
hostilities in Vietnam. The principals of the Des Moines schools, aware of
the plan, adopted a policy prohibiting students from wearing armbands to
school. The students wore the armbands to school and were suspended until
they returned without the armbands. The students, through their fathers,
sued the schools, requesting an injunction restraining school officials from
disciplining petitioners and nominal damages.2' The district court upheld the
school authorities' ban on the armbands because it determined the prohibi-
tion was reasonable to prevent disturbance of school discipline, and an
equally divided Eighth Circuit affirmed without opinion. 2 The Supreme
Court reversed, sending shock waves down the corridors of public schools.2 3
In essence, the Court declared that absent "substantial disruption" or "mate-
20 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. Some Supreme Court opinions before 1969 could be viewed as
inaugurating the new era of student rights cases. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483, 495 (1954) (declaring Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection rights for students); West
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,642 (1943) (declaring a First Amendment right
not to salute the flag); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400-01, 403 (1923) (implying rights of
public school students by determining that the states cannot prohibit foreign language instruc-
tion). I begin with Tinker, however, because it more clearly addresses the school's ability to
keep order.
21 See T'nker, 393 U.S. at 504. One of the students, though not a petitioner, was only eight
years old and in the second grade. See id. at 516 (Black, J., dissenting). The Tinker majority
never questioned to what extent either little John Tinker or any of the other children was being
exploited merely as a vehicle for his parent's political views. But see Robert A. Burt, Developing
Constitutional Rights of, in, and for Children, LAw & CoN-EiMP. PROBS., Summer 1975, at 118,
124 (arguing that the facts of Tinker suggest that the armbands reflected the convictions of par-
ents imposed on their children); cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (recognizing that the parents were seeking to vindicate their own free exercise
claims).
22 See 7inker, 393 U.S. at 504-05.
23 See, e.g., Denno, supra note 5, at 53 (showing that Tinker severely limited the traditional
broad power of school officials); Perry A. Zirkel et al., Commentary, Tinkering with the First
Amendment Rights of Students, 37 EDuc. L. REP. 433,433 (West 1987) (characterizing Tinker as
a "stunning blow" to school authorities).
[Vol 65:49
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rial interference" with the education process, the school could not restrain
student expression.24
Eighteen years later, the Court again addressed student expression in
school in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser.25 A student, Matthew Fra-
ser, by his father as guardian ad litem, sued the school for attempting to disci-
pline him after he gave a nomination speech at a school assembly that
contained a number of obvious sexual metaphors that "glorifi[ed] male sexu-
ality."26 Students at the assembly reacted by simulating masturbation and
sexual intercourse with their hips, a reaction the Ninth Circuit termed merely
"boisterous." 27 Although the school district ultimately prevailed, the two
lower courts, relying on the Tinker substantial disruption/material interfer-
ence standard, had rejected the school's argument that it was justified in dis-
ciplining Fraser because the speech had a disruptive effect on the educational
process 28 Fraser was awarded $278 in damages and $12,750 in litigation
costs. 29 It took three years of litigation before the United States Supreme
Court finally told the Bethel School District that it was permitted to impose a
disciplinary sanction on Matthew Fraser.30
In some ways, the majority opinion in Fraser is little more than a reprise
of Justice Stewart's quip about obscenity-"I know it when I see it."31 The
majority opinion could be read as stating merely that "certain modes of ex-
pression are inappropriate in the school setting and this is one of them." Ac-
cording to the Court, the school's role in "teach[ing] by example the shared
values of a civilized social order" gave the school the power to discipline a
student who showed such disregard for civility.32
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,33 decided two years after Fra-
ser, addressed student First Amendment rights once again, this time in the
context of a school-sponsored newspaper.34 Students brought suit against the
school district, the school principal, and a teacher, alleging that their First
24 See 7lnker, 393 U.S. at 514.
25 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
26 Id at 678-79, 683. Fraser gave the following speech:
I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his character
is firm-but most of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm. Jeff Kuhl-
man is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take an issue
and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts-he drives hard, pushing
and pushing until finally-he succeeds. Jeff is a man who will go to the very end-
even the climax, for each and every one of you. So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-
president-he'll never come between you and the best our high school can be.
Id at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (internal quotation marks and alterations
omitted).
27 Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist., 755 F.2d 1356, 1360 (9th Cir. 1985). The court's full descrip-
tion was that "[w]hile the students' reaction to Fraser's speech may fairly be characterized as
boisterous, it was hardly disruptive of the educational process." Id.
28 See id at 1359.
29 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 679.
30 The incident occurred in 1983, see id. at 677, and the Supreme Court upheld the discipli-
nary action in 1986.
31 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
32 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
33 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
34 See id. at 262-64, 267.
1996]
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Amendment rights had been violated when the principal deleted two pages
of articles from one issue of the paper.3 5 The Court, noting that the paper
was published as part of the Journalism II class, decided that the standard it
had "articulated in Tinker for determining when a school may punish student
expression need not also be the standard for determining when a school may
refuse to lend its name and resources to the dissemination of student expres-
sion."'36 Instead, when exercising editorial control over the style and content
of student speech in school-sponsored activities, school officials are not con-
strained by the First Amendment "so long as their actions are reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concers. '37 As of this writing, the Court
has made no further pronouncements since Hazelwood regarding student ex-
pression in the public schools.
2. The Fourth Amendment
New Jersey v. T.L.O.38 was the Court's first and only foray into the
Fourth Amendment's application in the school setting until it decided Acton
in 1995. In TL.O. a high school teacher discovered two girls violating a
school rule by smoking in a lavatory. The teacher took the girls to the princi-
pal's office, where the assistant vice principal ("the principal") questioned
them about the incident. When one of the girls, T.L.O., denied smoking, the
principal searched her purse for cigarettes. While removing the cigarettes
from the purse, the principal came upon cigarette rolling papers, an item
closely associated with marijuana use. A thorough search of the purse re-
vealed several items that implicated the student in drug dealing.39 The princi-
pal turned the items over to the police, T.L.O. confessed to selling marijuana
at the high school, and the State brought delinquency charges against her.n0
T.L.O. moved to suppress the evidence found in her purse along with the
confession, contending that the principal's search violated her Fourth
Amendment rights.41 The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in T.L.0. on
two separate occasions in two separate Terms.42 When the Court finally an-
nounced its decision in T.L. 0., five Justices wrote opinions.
35 See id. at 262, 264. One article discussed the experience of three students with their
pregnancies. The other discussed the impact of divorce on students. The principal excised the
articles because he thought the pregnant girls might be identifiable from the text, because he
believed the article's references to sexual activity and birth control might be inappropriate to
some of the younger students, and because he believed that parents in the divorce story should
have had a chance to respond to accusations that appeared in the article. See ld. at 263.
36 Id. at 272-73 (footnote omitted).
37 Id. at 273 (footnote omitted); cf. Romano v. Harrington, 725 F. Supp. 687 (E.D.N.Y.
1989) (limiting Hazelwood's constraint on student expression to class newspapers).
38 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
39 See id. at 328.
40 See id. at 328-29.
41 See id. at 329.
42 Certiorari was originally granted to examine if the exclusionary rule was applicable to
searches conducted by school officials, an issue on which courts disagreed. After hearing argu-
ment on that issue, the Court ordered reargument to decide what limits the Fourth Amendment
places on searches by school officials. See iLd. at 332 & n.2.
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The Court rejected the argument that teachers and administrators act in
loco parentis in their dealings with students and therefore are not subject to
the constraints of the Fourth Amendment,43 although this argument had been
accepted by some lower courts.44 Instead, the Court determined that the
Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by school officials, but it
was unwilling to constrain teachers with the full warrant and probable cause
standard usually required of the State.45 The Court declared that the proper
standard for assessing the searches conducted by public school officials is one
of reasonable suspicion that the search will turn up evidence that the student
has violated the law or a school rule.46 In the case at hand, the Court ruled
that the search met this reasonableness standard and that the evidence in
T.L.O.'s purse could be admitted at the delinquency proceedings. 47 The
Court explicitly left open the question it later would address in Acton:48
whether individualized suspicion was necessary for a school search.49
3. The Fourteenth Amendment
In Goss v. Lopez,50 decided in 1975, the Court, in a 5-4 vote, determined
that students in public schools had procedural due process rights that af-
forded them "some kind of notice" and "some kind of hearing" before the
school had the power to suspend them.51 Just two years later, in Ingraham v.
Wright,52 another 5-4 decision, the Court decided that students did not have
procedural due process rights that would afford them any notice or hearing
before being paddled at school53
In describing the facts of the Goss case, the majority cryptically stated
that the petitioners were suspended during a "period of widespread student
unrest" 54 that was "a time of great difficulty. '55 Six of the named plaintiffs
were suspended for disruptive or disobedient conduct committed directly in
the presence of the school principal, who then immediately ordered the sus-
pensions. One of the named plaintiffs was among a group of students dem-
onstrating in the school auditorium while a teacher attempted to conduct a
43 See id. at 336-37. In the T.L.O. litigation, the New Jersey trial court held that the rea-
sonableness standard should be lower because of the application of the in loco parentis doctrine.
See State ex rel T.L.O., 428 A.2d 1327, 1333 (N.J. Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1980). The New Jersey
Supreme Court rejected the application of the in loco parentis doctrine. See State ex rel. T.L.O.,
463 A.2d 934, 938-39 (N.J. 1983).
44 See infra note 89.
45 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340-41.
46 See id. at 341-42.
47 See id. at 347-48.
48 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
49 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 n.8.
50 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
51 Id. at 579 (emphasis omitted).
52 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
53 See id at 682. The difference in the outcome in Goss and Ingraham is a result of Justice
Potter Stewart changing sides. The Ingraham Court also determined that paddling at school did
not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See id. at
664.
54 Goss, 419 U.S. at 569.
55 Id. at 581 n.9.
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class there.56 When the school principal ordered him to leave, and he refused
to do so, he was suspended 7 The school principal also saw another plaintiff
physically attack a police officer who was attempting to remove the first stu-
dent from the auditorium. The second student was also immediately sus-
pended. Four other students were suspended for similar conduct. None was
given a presuspension hearing.5 8 The Goss Court first determined that the
students had legitimate claims of entitlement to a public education as a prop-
erty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.59 Moreover, the suspen-
sion and the record thereof could deprive the student of his liberty interest in
"good name, reputation, honor, [and] integrity," interests that the Court at
the time had held were also protected by the Due Process Clause.60 The
Court rejected the school administrators' argument that the students' claim
of entitlement-based on the state law providing for free education-was
limited by the law itself, which permitted school principals to suspend stu-
dents for 10 days.61 The Court also determined that even temporary exclu-
sion from school is "not de minimis," and thus due process must be afforded
the student so deprived.62 After explaining that due process applied, the
Court held that a student must receive oral or written notice of the charges
against him, an explanation of the evidence the authorities possessed, and an
opportunity to present his side of the story.63
The students in Ingraham-one of whom was subjected to over twenty
licks with a paddle that resulted in a hematoma requiring medical attention-
were not granted notice of the charges against them or the opportunity to
explain their actions.64 The Ingraham majority first determined that the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment ap-
plied only to those convicted of crimes, not to the paddling of school chil-
dren.65 But because corporal punishment involves "restraining the child and
inflicting appreciable physical pain," the Court held that the student's Four-
56 See id. at 569.
57 See id at 569-70.
58 See id. at 570. Three additional plaintiffs were suspended without a hearing, but it was
not clear on what information the decision was based. See id at 570-71.
59 See idL at 574.
60 Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The following year, in Paul v. Da-
vis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976), the Court held that there is no liberty interest in reputation alone.
61 See Goss, 419 U.S. at 575-76; see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S.
532, 541 (1985) (holding that property "cannot be defined by the procedures provided for its
deprivation"); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-94 (1980) (holding that the transfer of a prisoner
from a jail to a mental facility was a deprivation of liberty, and procedural requirements regulat-
ing the transfer were independent from the liberty interest held by the prisoner). But see Bishop
v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345-47 (1976) (holding that a public employee receives procedural due
process protection only if the law or contract defining the job expressly states that the employee
can be fired solely for cause).
62 Goss, 419 U.S. at 576.
63 See id. at 581. The Court stated that it was addressing only "the short suspension, not
exceeding 10 days." Id. at 584. It cautioned that "[1]onger suspensions or expulsions... may
require more formal procedures." Id; cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31-57 (1967) (requiring formal
due process standards and criminal constitutional protections in juvenile court proceedings).
64 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 657, 674-82 (1977).
65 See id at 664.
[Vol 65:49
HeinOnline -- 65 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.  58 1996-1997
Keeping Order in Public Schools
teenth Amendment liberty interests were implicated.66 Nonetheless, the
Court saw no need for a Goss-type hearing.67 At common law, teachers were
permitted to inflict corporal punishment on children in their care, and the
Court reasoned that state remedies were sufficient protection against the
abuse of that privilege.68 Moreover, imposing even an informal hearing
before paddling would be too much of a burden on the teacher trying to
maintain classroom order.69 In short, the Court explicitly made a cost-benefit
analysis and decided that the likely impairment of teacher authority and re-
sulting loss of school discipline was too important to jeopardize, even for a
constitutional liberty interest.
The cases discussed above arose in different contexts, but each involved
the same underlying issue, an issue the Court does not acknowledge but that
has nonetheless driven its analysis in all of these cases: how much power
should a school have over students? In Part B, I illustrate how-until Ac-
ton-the Court failed to admit the real issue behind the school discipline
cases-school power. Instead of addressing the issue directly and coherently,
the Court created what I call the school power continuum and used that
structure to set forth the confusing and often conflicting constitutional stan-
dards described above.
B. The School Power Continuum
As it attempted to mesh student constitutional rights with the weighty
responsibilities that educators have for the children entrusted to their care,
the Court never came to terms with the real issue behind the school cases.
Instead, to avoid dealing explicitly with the thorny problems surrounding the
nature of school power, the Court implicitly constructed a continuum of
school power.70 On one end of the continuum is the power of the parent,
who is not constrained by the Constitution. On the other end is the power of
the State which, of course, is constrained by the Constitution. Although the
Court was uncomfortable with the notion that school officials possessed the
delegated power of the parent, the Court has not limited teachers only to the
power the State is allowed to assert against individuals. The Court has ac-
knowledged that schools are "special" and thus need more power over
schoolchildren than the State generally has over adult citizens in other con-
texts. But no guiding principle has emerged with regard to where school
power should rank on the parent-state continuum.71
66 Id. at 674. The Court explicitly stated that the case did not involve a state-created prop-
erty interest. See id. at 674 n.43.
67 See id. at 674-75.
68 See id. at 674, 683.
69 See id. at 680-81.
70 See Lawrence F. Rossow & Jacqueline Stefkcovich, Vernonia School District v. Acton:
Suspicionless Drug Testing, 5 EDur. L.Q. 39,49 (1996) (suggesting that the relationship between
teacher and student may best be understood by envisioning a continuum).
71 The Court has also struggled with whether to import rights developed elsewhere for
adults into the juvenile justice system. Compare McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545,
553 (1971) (plurality opinion of Blackmun, J., and concurrence of White, J.) (holding that there
is no right to a jury in juvenile proceedings), with Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528-31 (1975)
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When the Tinker Court declared that constitutional rights followed stu-
dents through the schoolhouse gate, the notion that school power was like
that of a parent-the common-law doctrine of in loco parentis-slipped out
the back door. For if school authority over students is constrained by the
Constitution, that authority cannot really be like that of a parent, who is not
so constrained. But, until Acton, the Court never explained what the nature
of school power is, if it is not that of the parent. Instead, unfettered by the in
loco parentis doctrine, the Justices were left to decide what power the school
needed-what rank the school would be given on the school power contin-
uum-based on their own views of the public school as an institution.
The Tinker Court could have analyzed school power as identical to that
of the state, thus imposing the same burden on schools with regard to consti-
tutional constraints that is imposed generally on the state. But the Tinker
Court was not prepared to go so far. Instead, Justice Fortas wrote, "First
Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment, are available to teachers and students. ' 72 After admitting that
the school is "special," and thus different from the state, Justice Fortas could
then have explained what made the school special and set forth explicitly the
nature of the school's power over the student in light of these "special char-
acteristics." 73 But instead of clarifying the nature of school power, the Court
waffled between its assertion that students have constitutional rights and the
school's need for some kind of power over students. After noting that the
school has special characteristics, the Court's next sentence set forth the now-
familiar declaration that neither "students [nor] teachers shed their constitu-
tional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."74
"On the other hand," hedged Justice Fortas, "the Court has repeatedly em-
phasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States
and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards,
to prescribe and control conduct in the schools. ' 75
The Court correctly set up the problem-the need to reconcile the rights
of the individual student that passed through the schoolhouse gate with the
tradition of affirming school power-but never solved it. Instead of defining
the nature of school power, the Court created the parent-state power contin-
uum. The Court did so by setting forth a standard for constitutional review
that placed a somewhat lower burden on the school's ability to place restric-
tions on student speech than would be placed on the State in other contexts,
but that placed more constraints on the school than could be placed on a
parent.76 By declaring that the school should not have the power to restrain
(holding that prosecution in adult court after juvenile court proceedings had determined that a
minor was unfit for treatment as a juvenile violated the Double Jeopardy Clause).
72 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (emphasis
added).
73 Not until Acton does the Court attempt to do so. See infra notes 265-307 and accompa-
nying text.
74 Tinker, 393 U.S at 506.
75 Id. at 507.
76 See Lawrence M. Friedman, Limited Monarchy: The Rise and Fall of Student Rights, in
SCHOOL DAYS, RULE DAYS 238,245 (David L. Kirp & Donald N. Jensen eds., 1986) (contending
that after Tinker "the power of schools no longer derived from parental power").
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student speech absent "substantial disruption" or "material interference"
with the education process, 77 the Court allowed the school some greater de-
gree of power than the State possesses generally because of the "special char-
acteristics of the school environment. 78 But the Court never explained what
these special characteristics are and, more importantly, failed to articulate
the nature of the power that the school possesses in light of those special
characteristics.
The Court has continued in the manner set forth in the Tinker opinion-
floundering about on the school power continuum without articulating the
nature of school power-for over twenty-five years. The next time the Court
addressed student expression in schools, in Fraser,79 the Court again failed to
illuminate the nature of the power the school possessed. But the Fraser
Court, although failing to craft a principle that explained what power the
school had, did explain why the school had the power to discipline Fraser for
a speech given at school.80 Again, like Tinker, the Court pointed out that
schools are "special" but, unlike the Tinker opinion, the Fraser Court at-
tempted to describe what characteristics of the school made it "special."81
The "special characteristic" of the public school that was important to the
Fraser Court was the school's role in inculcating the "habits and manners of
civility" that are "necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political sys-
tem."'82 Given this important role, the Court was willing to allow school offi-
cials the power to discipline students for speech that is "wholly inconsistent
with the 'fundamental values' of public school education," even if the speech
did not meet the material disruption standard set by Tinker.83 Thus, the
Court established two places on the school power continuum for student ex-
pression in school: one for speech like that of Matthew Fraser's where school
power was closer to that of a parent and another for speech like that of Mary
Beth Tinker where school power was closer to that of the state.
The Court moved the pointer on the school power continuum one more
time when it addressed student expression in the school newspaper in Hazel-
wood.84 Again the Court merely discussed why the school was special in this
case and once more failed to address the nature of school power.85 This time
the Court decided that the school was special because of its pedagogical func-
tion when the student expression was a part of a classroom learning experi-
ence.86 The Hazelwood Court accordingly allowed school officials power
77 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
78 Id. at 506. Compare Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-47 (1983) and Pickering v.
Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968), both of which held that a state's interests as an em-
ployer in regulating the speech of employees differs from those it possesses in connection with
the regulation of the speech of citizenry in general.
79 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
80 See id. at 681.
81 See id. at 681-84.
82 Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
83 Id. at 685-86. The Court also noted the "marked distinction between the political
'message'" in Tinker and the "sexual content" of the speech in Fraser. Id. at 680.
84 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262 (1988).
85 See id. at 266-67.
86 See id. at 272-73.
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over the content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities if
the exercise of power is "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical con-
cerns."87 The place on the continuum where the Court placed school power
changed from Tinker to Fraser to Hazelwood. In short, the Court merely
decided how much power the school should have, pointed to that place on
the continuum, and then allowed public schools that amount of power.
Before the Supreme Court decided New Jersey v. T.L.O*88 in 1985, the
lower courts were deeply split regarding whether schools were subject to the
constraints of the Fourth Amendment. Some courts had held that teachers
acted in loco parentis, with the authority of the parent, rather than the State,
and were thus not restrained by the Fourth Amendment at all.89 Other
courts had determined that the Fourth Amendment and its probable cause
standard applied in full to searches by teachers. 90 Still others attempted to
find a point somewhere in the middle of the school power continuum-the
point the Supreme Court ultimately chose91-and upheld warrantless
searches that were supported by a "reasonable suspicion" that the search
would uncover evidence of a violation of a school rule or a violation of the
law.92
It is plain in T.L.O.-in which five Justices wrote opinions-that the
Justices were struggling with the inherent incoherence in the school power
continuum the Court had created. The majority opinion simply decided that
the in loco parentis doctrine was "in tension with contemporary reality" and
with cases like Tinker and Goss.93 The Court, however, failed to clarify what
power was left to the school if in loco parentis power was no longer realistic.
It merely stated that, although the Fourth Amendment applied to school
searches, school officials would not be required to obtain a warrant or to
search only when they had probable cause.94 Based on the special character-
87 Id. at 273 (footnote omitted).
88 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
89 See id. at 332 n.2 (citing cases); see also Ranniger v. State, 460 S.W.2d 181,182 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1970) (deciding that a school principal stood in loco parentis "with the parent's duties,
rights and responsibilities"). Sometimes courts do not embrace the in loco parentis doctrine
fully, but they are influenced by it. See, eg., In re W., 105 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1973) (balancing in
loco parentis status against reasonableness); People v. Jackson, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1971) (explaining that an in loco parentis relationship is critical in applying the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness standard).
90 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 332 n.2 (citing State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317, 319 (La.) (conclud-
ing that school officials are within the full purview of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition),
vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975), on remand, 330 So. 2d 900, 901 (La. 1976) (relying on both federal
and state law to conclude that a principal and an instructor were functioning as government
agents)); Picha v. Wieglos, 410 F. Supp. 1214,1220-21 (W.D. Ill. 1976) (holding that when school
officials search for evidence of a crime with substantial police involvement, the Fourth Amend-
ment probable cause standard applies).
91 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-42.
92 See id. at 332-33 n.2 (citing cases); see also People v. Jackson, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731, 734-36
(Sup. Ct. App. Term. 1971) (explaining that the in loco parentis doctrine makes any search of
students reasonable if based upon reasonable suspicion), aff'd, 284 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1972).
93 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336.
94 See id. at 340-41.
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istics of the school, "a certain degree of flexibility" is necessary, so reason-
able suspicion is enough.95
Justice Powell's concurrence, joined by Justice O'Connor, also stressed
the "special characteristics" of the school and the "special relationship" be-
tween teacher and student.96 Justice Blackmun, like Justice Powell, agreed
that the school is a "special" institution with a "special need for flexibility."97
Within that "special" institution, teachers focus on the task of "teaching and
helping" students.98 Because of the increasing problem of weapons and
drugs in schools, teachers need the power to respond quickly to problems "to
maintain an environment conducive to learning" and "to protect the very
safety of students." 99 The time taken by the teacher to develop probable
cause would divert teachers from the task of educating.100
Both Justice Powell's and Justice Blackmun's descriptions of the "spe-
cial" qualities of the school as an institution are important because they ex-
plain why the Court could allow schools more power than it would allow the
State generally. But they again failed to define just what that power is. Jus-
tice Powell merely described the power teachers have as broad, "unparalleled
except perhaps in the relationship between parent and child,"''1 and the up-
shot of that power: schools need not comply with the "full panoply" of consti-
tutional rules. 02 Neither Justice fully defined the nature of the power he
described. 0 3
The pronouncements of the Goss and Ingraham Courts, a mere two
years apart, demonstrate how the Court's failure to deal explicitly and coher-
ently with the question of school power results in confusion and misunder-
standing. Like Tinker, the Goss Court placed an appreciable restraint on the
school: only a student whose presence poses a "continuing danger" or an
"ongoing threat" to the school community could be removed from school
95 Id. at 340; cf. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679
(1989) (permitting a warrantless, suspicionless drug testing search of employees who handle
drugs or firearms by the Government when acting as an employer).
96 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 348-49 (Powell, J., concurring).
97 Id. at 352 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
98 Id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
99 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
100 See id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Blackmun is more candid than
other Justices in admitting that his views are drawn from his own experience that he surmises
others have shared. He notes that "every parent knows" that children will test the boundaries of
acceptable conduct and imitate misbehavior and assumes "[ejvery adult remembers from his
own schooldays the havoc a water pistol or pea shooter can wreak until it is taken away." Id. at
352. Having seen firsthand the necessity for the school to maintain order and having viewed how
the school wielded its power (at least in removing the water pistol or pea shooter), he was less
wary of a school with the power to search absent probable cause and a warrant.
101 Id. at 348 (Powell, J., concurring).
102 Id. at 350 (Powell, J., concurring).
103 Unlike Justices Powell and Blackmun, Justice Brennan did not perceive a special rela-
tionship between teacher and student; instead, he equated teachers with "all other government
officials." Id. at 353 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Nevertheless, he
acknowledged the special characteristics of the school setting, where students are confined in
close proximity to each other and staff. See id. at 357. Given this special setting and the preva-
lence of drugs and violence, schools needed the power to search without a warrant. See id.
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without prior notice and hearing.104 Nonetheless, the Court refrained from
requiring the school to afford students the opportunity to secure counsel,
confront and cross-examine witnesses, or call their own witnesses to verify
their version of the incident.10 5
In Ingraham, the Court saw no need for any kind of hearing at all.106 At
common law, teachers were permitted to inflict corporal punishment on chil-
dren in their care, and the Court reasoned that state remedies were sufficient
protection against the abuse of that privilege. 107 Moreover, imposing even an
informal hearing before paddling would be too much of a burden on the
teacher trying to maintain classroom order. 08
A careful study of Goss and Ingraham reveals the reason for the Court's
problem with school power. In short, the Goss and Ingraham opinions repre-
sent two starkly different premises regarding the public school as an institu-
tion.1°9 On one side were the Justices who essentially viewed the institution
as the adversary of the child, whom the Court must protect as the child at-
tempts to rebut the values that the school attempts to inculcate." 0 On the
other side were the Justices who viewed the institution and its students as
sharing in a common enterprise that consisted, at least in part, of teaching
children how to be responsible citizens. In the next Part, I consider each of
these models in turn and show how the Court has tottered from one model to
the other in its attempt to resolve the school power question.
II. Two Models of School Power
The continuum between parent and state that the Court constructed in
the cases that addressed the school's power to keep order was actually the
result of a more fundamental question about public schools. It reflected the
deeper-though unstated-conflict between two different philosophies re-
garding the mission and character of the public school: social reconstruction
versus social reproduction. Part A explains these two models of school
power. Part B analyzes how the Court has moved between these two models
in its attempt to discern how much power the school has over students.
A. Social Reconstruction and Social Reproduction
The amount of power we are willing to confer upon our institutions is a
function of the confidence we have in those institutions to wield that power
appropriately. The reconstruction and reproduction models present different
104 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 582-83 (1975). The Court was concerned that imposing
"even truncated, trial-type procedures" on the "countless" brief disciplinary suspensions that
schools deal with "might well overwhelm administrative facilities" and divert resources, costing
"more than it would save in educational effectiveness." Id.
105 See id. at 583.
106 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 682 (1977).
107 See id. at 681-83.
108 See id. at 680.
109 See William B. Senhauser, Note, Education and the Court The Supreme Court's Educa-
tional Ideology, 40 VAND. L. REv. 939, 959 (1987) (noting that the 5-4 decision in Goss showed
sharp division in the Court over the proper role of education in society).
110 These Justices were the Goss majority and the Ingraham dissenters.
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views regarding the trust that should be afforded the public school. Indeed,
the two models look upon the school as an institution from two sharply dif-
ferent perspectives. Each views the school as having a unique mission, but
the two missions are seemingly wholly incompatible with each other.
1. Social Reconstruction
In the social reconstruction model, the school is an institution where
power is necessary only to facilitate the child in his attempts to reconstruct a
new social order. In fact, the primary mission of the school under this model
is to effect "cultural change" in an attempt to move toward a new "planet-
wide democratic order.""' The school as a force in reconstructing a new
social order was a reverse of the traditional function of public education in
American society, in which the power of the school was necessary to incul-
cate-to reproduce-society's traditions and habits." 2
In contrast to the social reproduction model, which would allow the
school the power it needed to mold children in society's image, the social
reconstruction model would allow the student the power the student needs to
avoid perpetuating society's flaws. To achieve its goal, the reconstruction
model endeavors to support those students who rebut the values that the
school is trying to inculcate." 3
The clash between the reconstruction and reproduction models reflects
conflicts about the mission of the public school that are deeply rooted in
American intellectual history. The writings of John Dewey are often viewed
as the genesis of the reconstruction model." 4 Dewey viewed education "as a
major force in social reconstruction" with the child in constant battle with his
adult adversaries as he tries to free himself from society's tainted tradi-
tions." 5 The reconstructionists were influenced by the romantic view of the
111 V.T. THAYER, FORMATIVE IDEAS IN AMERICAN EDUCATION: FROM THE COLONIAL PE-
RIOD TO THE PRESENT 319 (1966) (quoting THEODORE BRAMELD, EDUCATION FOR THE EMERO-
rNo AGE 26 (1961)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Theodore Brameld coined the term
"reconstructionism" to refer to his belief that "the mission of a philosophy of education is to
point the way toward the reconstruction of a culture, 'which, left unreconstructed, will almost
certainly collapse of its own frustrations and conflicts." Id. at 318-19 (quoting BRAMELD, supra,
at 1).
112 See id. at 312.
113 See JoiN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 92 (1916) ("[I]nstead of reproducing
current habits, better habits shall be formed .... ).
114 Dewey was perhaps the most influential American philosopher of the early twentieth
century. Henry Steele Commanger called Dewey "the guide, the mentor, and the conscience of
the American people," and he declared: "it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that for a genera-
tion no major issue was clarified until Dewey had spoken." HENRY STEELE COMMANGER, THE
AMERICAN MIND 100 (1950), quoted in ROBERT B. WESTBROOK, JOHN DEWEY AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACy xiv (1991).
115 RICHARD HOFsTADTER, ANTI-INTELLECrUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE 363 (1963); see
also LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SCHOOL: PROGRESSMISM IN AMERI-
CAN EDUCATION 1876-1957, at 118 (1961) (positing that Dewey cast the school "as a lever of
social change" and thrust the educator into the struggle for social reform). Of course, political
conditions also had a part to play in social changes. See DEWEY, supra note 113, at 115; HOF-
STADTER, supra, at 378.
Dewey was not alone in this view. Many educators, disturbed by the disintegrating effects
of the Depression upon American society, believed that the school should seize the initiative and
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child formulated by European writers like Rousseau, Pestalozzi, and
Froebel-that the child "came into [the] world trailing clouds of glory, and it
was the holy office of the teacher to see that he remained free, instead of
assisting in the imposition of alien codes upon him. 11 6 The education re-
formers at the end of the nineteenth century thus set up an antithesis be-
tween the "development of the individual" and the "imperatives of social
order," that is, the "natural child against artificial society. 11 7 The central
idea of the new educational movement was that "the school should base its
studies not on the demands of society, nor on any conception of what an
educated person should be, but on the developing needs and interests of the
child." 8
If the needs and interests of the child were to define what is necessary
for an education, the school must do no more than accommodate the stu-
dents as they developed physically and emotionally. Dewey was particularly
concerned about adult authority. He desperately wanted to stop adult soci-
ety from inculcating a conformist character in the child through the
teacher,119 and he saw adult authority as "the" threat to the child. 120
proceed to educate "for a new social order more in harmony with" democratic principles.
THAYER, supra note 111, at 314 (citing GEORGE S. COUNTS, DARE THE SCHOOLS BUxLD A NEW
SOCIAL ORDER? (1932)). Some reformers called on teachers to participate "actively in the task
of reconstituting the democratic tradition and [to work] positively toward a new social order."
Id. at 317 (quoting COMMrIrEE ON Soc. AND ECON. PROBLEMS, PROGRESsnvE EDUC. ASS'N, A
CALL TO THE TEACHERS OF THE NATION 18-19 (1933)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Hafen, supra note 4, at 676 (describing schools in the progressive era as "a source of social
and political regeneration") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
116 HOFSTADTER, supra note 115, at 368; see also id. at 362-63 (noting that despite Dewey's
post-Darwinian scientific positivism, Dewey's conception of the child drew largely from romanti-
cism); ALBERT LYND, QUACKERY IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 178 (1953) (noting the influence of
Rousseau and Pestalozzi on Dewey). Compare Hofstadter's view with that of Richard Wight-
man Fox, who argues that "Dewey was not the child-centered romantic that conservative critics
have made him out to be," Richard Wightman Fox, The Great Pragmatist, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6,
1995, at 21 (Book Review), and Alan Ryan, who is critical of Hofstadter's view of Dewey, but
also acknowledges Dewey's "political conception" of education. ALAN RYAN, JOHN DEWEY
AND THE HIGH TIDE OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM 296, 347-49 (1995); see also A.S. NEILL, SUM-
MERHILL: A RADICAL APPROACH TO CILD REARING 4-8 (1960) (extolling a school where disci-
pline, direction and suggestion are renounced in favor of student choice); Senhauser, supra note
109, at 945 (stating that under the romantic view, the school should allow the child's "social
virtues to control the child's antisocial behavior") (footnote omitted). But see CREMIN, supra
note 115, at 14, 18 (discussing the view of former U.S. Commissioner of Education William
Torrey Harris (1889-1906), a student of Hegel, who believed "the school must lead the child to
freedom by leading him away from his primitive self"); THTAYER, supra note 111, at 344 (describ-
ing Walter Lippmann's criticism of Rousseau and Froebel and "the cult of the child").
117 HOEsTADTER, supra note 115, at 368. The notion of the "natural" child does not stem
entirely from a romantic "child of nature" heritage. It also has roots in post-Darwinian "natural-
ism" and the idea of the "naturalistic" child who would use his mind "instrumentally to solve
various problems presented by his environment." lId at 362. Even Dewey refused to believe
that the antithesis between the child and society was a finality, but "hoped to achieve a harmoni-
ous synthesis of the two." Id at 374.
118 Id at 369. But see THAYER, supra note 111, at 314-15 (quoting George S. Counts as
criticizing this child-centered focus as lacking.a theory of social welfare "unless it be that of
anarchy of extreme individualism") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
119 See HOFsTADTER, supra note 115, at 382 (citing DEWEY, supra note 113, at 60).
120 Id. at 383; see also JoHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 177 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed.,
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Against this background Dewey set forth his conception of education as
growth, "the characteristic of life" that "has no end beyond itself."'121 Be-
cause growth goes on automatically, it allowed Dewey's followers to elabo-
rate on his metaphor-to contrast the "good" self-determining growth from
within (the child) with the "bad" molding from without (the school, the
teacher). 22 "ITIhe growth of the child stood for health, [while] the traditions
of society... stood for outworn, excessively authoritative demands."'123
2. Social Reproduction
Social reconstruction was a reaction against an earlier and altogether
different account of the school's role. If "conscious social reproduction"'124 is
the school's mission, the school must proclaim the child's place in society by
inculcating society's traditions and habits.125 Only in "the arduous process of
training children to self-discipline" will the public school fulfill its commit-
ment to freedom.126 Unlike the reconstructionists, proponents of the social
reproduction model emphasize "the part played by institutions in maintain-
ing the existing democratic order."'127
Influenced in part by Horace Mann's concept of the universal public
school, the reconstructionists advance the concept that the school plays a vi-
tal part in creating a sense of community and molding character based on a
shared philosophy.128 The child and the teacher are not adversaries. Rather,
as a member of the school community, the child has a concurrent interest
with the school, that is, "a constitutive relation [ ] between individual [good]
and social good based on knowledge."'129 In fact, the student depends on his
relationship with school and teacher, much like his relationship with his par-
1974) (1859) ("State education is a mere contrivance for molding people to be exactly like one
another .... ).
121 DEWEY, supra note 113, at 62.
122 See HoFsrADTER, supra note 115, at 373-74 ("[T]he concept of individual growth be-
came a hostage in the hands of educational thinkers who were obsessed with the child-centered
school.").
123 Id. at 374.
124 AMY GutrMANN, DnmocA- c EDUCATION 14 (1987) (describing "conscious social re-
production" as "the ways in which citizens are or should be empowered to influence the educa-
tion that in turn shapes the political values, attitudes, and modes of behavior of future citizens");
cf. Senhauser, supra note 109, at 943 (describing "cultural transmission" education ideology as
the "transmission of knowledge, skills, morals, and social rules to the student") (citing Lawrence
Kohlberg & Rochelle Mayer, Development as the Aim of Education, 42 HARv. EDUC. REv. 449,
452-53 (1972)).
125 Indeed, some educators, critical of the reformers who strove for a new social order, saw
the school as an institution that could not construct new social ideas, but could only transmit
those that were already accepted. See THAYER, supra note 111, at 318 (citing Nathaniel Peffer,
Educators [Groping] for the Stars, 168 HARPER'S MAGAZINE 230,232 (1934)); see also Corners,
supra note 115, at 3 ("[S]chools, instead of directing the course of change, are themselves driven
by the very forces that are transforming the rest of the social order."), reprinted in EDUCAION
IN AMERICAN LnFE 168, 169 (W. Richard Stephens et al. eds., 1972).
126 CREmIN, supra note 115, at 11.
127 THAYER, supra note 111, at 323 (quoting I.B. BERKSON, Ti IDEAL AND THE COMMU-
Nrm'y 17 (1958)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
128 See FRED M. H-ECnNGER & GRAcE HECHrNOER, GROWING UP IN AMERICA 58 (1975).
129 GUTMANN, supra note 124, at 23.
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ents, to provide him with the qualities necessary to be a responsible citizen in
the social compact and to participate in our popular form of government. On
the other hand, the school, as a part of the larger community, needs its
young, as future citizens of the community, to understand both the rights and
responsibilities of citizenship.
Under the reproduction model, the school must guide the student much
in the same manner as a parent. To do so, the school must have power simi-
lar to that of a parent-power often described by the Latin phrase in loco
parentis.130 The doctrine of in loco parentis has roots deep in the common
law and was born at a time when social reproduction was the dominant, if not
the only, theory of the mission of the school. Historically, the authority of
the schoolmaster over his students was analogous to that of the master over
his apprentice. 13' During the settlement of the American Colonies, the Eng-
lish statutes of artificers, apprentices and labor provided that every person
who wished "to set up, occupy, use or exercise any craft, mystery, or occupa-
tion" shall serve for seven years as an apprentice. 132 Although the statutes
served the economy of the period, the social, moral and educational aspects
of apprenticeship were as important as its economic character. Indeed, the
training received in apprenticeships was the basic model for education for the
lower class in all the colonies during the seventeenth century. 133 The appren-
tice served without pay, but in return the master was required to give him
food, clothing and lodging. The master was also required to teach the ap-
prentice and to take responsibility for the apprentice's moral conduct and
training. 34 Because the master took over the care of the child to such a
degree, he possessed the same authority over the child as the parent.
Of course, the children of the upper classes did not serve as apprentices.
The normal method of education for the upper class was tutorial instruction
in the home, 135 a voluntary relationship that allowed for the theory that par-
ents chose to delegate part of their authority to the tutor. As Blackstone put
it, the father may:
delegate part of his parental authority, during his life, to the tutor or
schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis, and has such
130 "In the place of a parent." BLACK'S LAw DICTnONARY 787 (6th ed. 1990).
13' See Anderson v. State, 40 Tenn. (3 Head) 455, 457 (1859) (noting the similar relation-
ship of schoolmaster and scholar, parent and child, and master and apprentice). Indeed, even
the name "schoolmaster," rather than teacher, connotes a master-apprentice relationship in the
school setting.
132 PAUL MONROE, FOUNDING OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM 7 (1940) (citing
An Act Containing Divers Orders for Artificers, Labourers, Servants of Husbandry and Ap-
prentices, 5 Eliz., ch. IV (1562) (Eng.) in IV Statutes at Large 159, 170 (Cambridge Univ. ed.
1763)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
133 See id. at 46 (pointing out that even in New England the earliest educational laws were
apprenticeship laws, rather than school laws); THAYER, supra note 111, at 3 (explaining that the
early legislation in New England that foreshadowed public responsibility for education was pri-
marily apprenticeship law, "similar in design to English law and intended to remedy the great
neglect in many parents and masters in training up their children in learning and labor and other
employments which may be profitable to the commonwealth").
134 See MoNROE, supra note 132, at 7.
135 See id. at 61.
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a portion of the power of the parent committed to his charge, viz.
that of restraint and correction, as may be necessary to answer the
purposes for which he is employed. 136
When the basic educational model moved from apprenticeship and pri-
vate tutors to schools, in loco parentis moved with it.137 The nature of the
teacher's power over the student was correlative to that of the parent over his
child. 138 Moreover, good order and respect for the teacher were two general
concepts "necessary" for the teacher to effect the mission of inculcating soci-
ety's values and so "to answer the purposes for which he is employed.' 39
The diffusion of knowledge through the common school was the way the
social reproductionist ensured that the fabric of government continued to
stand. According to Mann, known as the father of the American public
school, "[t]he theory of our government is,-not that all men, however unfit,
shall be voters,-but that every man, by the power of reason and the sense of
duty [obtained through education], shall become fit to be a voter.' 140 Thus,
in the social reproduction model, public schools would preserve, not recon-
struct, republican institutions to create a political community. 141
136 1 WILLIAM BLAcKSToNE, COMMENTARIES *453. Even Blackstone did not view the tu-
tor's power as being coextensive with the parent, but limited the power to that "as may be
necessary to answer the purposes for which he is employed." Id.; see also Guerrieri v. Tyson, 24
A.2d 468, 469 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1942) (cautioning that a teacher has the status of parent to aid in
education, not to treat a nonemergency injury or disease of a student); Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt.
114, 122-23 (1859) (finding that the schoolmaster is not entrusted with all of the parent's author-
ity); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 152, 154 (1965) (limiting in loco parentis authority to
the purposes of the school's existence); Stephen R. Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School
Board Authority to Regulate Student Conduct and Status: A Nonconstitutional Analysis, 117 U.
PA. L. REv. 373, 380-82 (1969) (explaining that school authorities do not completely displace
parents); Paul 0. Proehl, Tort Liability of Teachers, 12 VArD. L. REv. 723, 727 & n.24 (1959)
(describing teacher authority as limited to situations under a teacher's control that are related to
the purposes of education).
137 Public schools were considered extensions of the home in light of the culturally homo-
geneous local communities where the line between neighborhood and family was often blurred.
See Bruce C. Hafen, Schools as Intellectual and MoralAssociations, 1993 BYU L. REv. 605, 608.
138 See Heritage v. Dodge, 64 N.H. 297 (1886) (ruling that a teacher was justified in the use
of corporal punishment against a student who coughed when the teacher believed it was to at-
tract attention and cause disturbance and it was later claimed that the student had whooping
cough, and stating that "[t]he law clothes the teacher, as it does the parent, in whose place he
stands, with power to enforce discipline by the imposition of reasonable corporal punishment")
(a slightly different version of the same case is reported at 9 A. 722 (N.H. 1887)); Lander, 32 Vt.
at 123 (quoting Blackstone for the proposition that the schoolmaster "has such a portion of the
powers of the parent") (emphasis omitted).
139 1 ,VILLxAm BLAcKS'ToNE, COMMENTARIES *453. See generally State v. Mizner, 45 Iowa
248, 250 (1876) (finding "no doubt" that a teacher may legally inflict reasonable discipline "for
the maintenance of his authority").
140 Horace Mann, The Lecture on Education in Joy ELMER MORGAN, HORACE MANN: HIs
IDEAS AND IDEALS 97-98 (1936). "In all nations, hardly excepting the most rude and barbarous,
the future sovereign receives some training which is supposed to fit him for the exercise of the
powers and duties of his anticipated station." Horace Mann, Twelfth Annual Report in THE
REPUBLIC AND THE SCHOOL: HORACE MANN ON THE EDUCATION OF FREE MEN 92 (Lawrence
A. Cremin ed., 1957).
141 See MORGAN, supra note 140, at 91; Rosemary C. Salomone, Free Speech and School
Governance in the Wake of Hazelwood, 26 GA. L. REv. 253, 255 (1992) (describing Mann's
view). Mann urged the creation of the public schools in the 1840s, at a time when his state,
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B. The Court and the Models of School Power
In essence, the debate about the two different models of school power is
really a deep disagreement about the very character and "meaning of the
public schools."'142 Are public schools "good" or "bad"? Are teachers the
adversary or the ally of the students they teach? A fundamental disagree-
ment about the answers to these questions-a disagreement that is some-
times based on the Justices' mistaken perception of day-to-day life in the
classroom-is at the heart of the Court's opinions dealing with school
power.143
As analyzed below, for the Justice who-either explicitly or implicitly-
viewed the public schools as an agent of social reconstruction, teachers are
not benevolent "quasi-parents" who should be trusted to act in the best inter-
est of the student. Rather, the teacher is the student's adversary, who will
constrict the child's efforts to free society from its oppressive past. Thus the
public school itself must be reconstituted. Respect, deference, trust, and es-
pecially discipline as an end itself have little value for the child who is in a
constant battle with his adult adversaries as he attempts to free himself of
society's tainted traditions. I now consider how the Court has lurched back
and forth between the reconstruction and reproduction models in its misbe-
gotten attempts to come to terms with the nature of school power.
1. In Loco Parentis
The reproduction model controlled the school power analysis with little
dissent when the nature of school authority rested in the doctrine of in loco
parentis, as it did under common law. In lawsuits filed against teachers in
which the student claimed that disciplinary measures were too harsh, the
teacher defended by claiming that the discipline was justified under the in
loco parentis doctrine.144 Courts generally allowed discipline by teachers that
could legally have been applied by parents and that was viewed as enhancing
good order in the classroom and respect for the teacher.145 The schoolmaster
Massachusetts, was trying to assimilate large numbers of non-English immigrants. This explains
his emphasis on the common schools for social reproduction. Dewey, on the other hand, was a
progressive reformer, who wanted to reconstruct, not reproduce, society. See Salomone, supra,
at 258.
142 Denno, supra note 5, at 60.
143 See Salomone, supra note 141, at 258 (noting that court decisions from the 1940s
through the 1970s reflect the ideology exemplified by Dewey's writings, while later cases are
concerned with "cultural transmission"); see also Senhauser, supra note 109, at 948, 979 (con-
tending that the Court's support of a particular education ideology is sometimes result-oriented).
144 See, e.g., Mizner, 45 Iowa at 250 (explaining that "the criminality of a charge of assault
and battery may be disproved by evidence showing that the act was lawful," as when a school-
master corrects his scholar in a reasonable manner).
145 See id. Courts also applied the in loco parentis doctrine to the relationship between
college authorities and students. See, e.g., Gott v. Berea College, 161 S.W. 204, 206 (Ky. 1913)
(stating that "[c]ollege authorities stand in loco parentis concerning the physical and moral wel-
fare and mental training of the pupils," and authorities may make rules or regulations that par-
ents could make for the same purpose). In the second half of the twentieth century, courts and
commentators saw the doctrine as obsolete and began using contract law to characterize the
student-university relationship. See Brian Jackson, Note, The Lingering Legacy of In Loco
Parentis: An Historical Survey and Proposal for Reform, 44 VAD. L. REv. 1135, 1136 (1991).
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generally had no right to punish a pupil for conduct that occurred after the
class was dismissed.146 Some courts, however, allowed teachers to punish the
pupil for speech-in one case for simply calling the defendant "Old Jack
Seaver" in front of fellow pupils-that occurred away from school because
the behavior might diminish the school master's authority and "beget disor-
der and insubordination" in the school.147 When chastising students, the
schoolmaster was required to exercise "reasonable judgment,"' 48 and he
would not be held liable unless the punishment was "clearly excessive."' 49
Even after states passed compulsory school laws,' 50 calling into question
the concept of voluntary delegation of parental power, the doctrine was so
well entrenched that courts continued to apply the in loco parentis doctrine in
school discipline and in school search cases.' 5 ' One court observed that in
loco parentis is "a social concept [that] antedat[ed] the Fourth Amend-
There is some dispute about the current state of in loco parentis in colleges. Compare James
J. Szablewicz & Annette Gibbs, Colleges' Increasing Exposure to Liability: The New In Loco
Parentis, 16 J.L. & EDuC. 453,464-65 (1987) (arguing that in loco parentis is making a comeback
in college tort and contract liability), and Philip M. Hirshberg, Note, The College's Emerging
Duty to Supervise Students: In Loco Parentis in the 1990s, 46 WASH. U. J. URa. & CoNrmMP. L.
189, 223 (1994), with Perry A. Zirkel & Henry F. Reichner, Is the In Loco Parentis Doctrine
Dead?, 15 J.L. & EDuC. 271,282 (1986) (positing that in loco parentis in the college context "has
undergone a clear rise and complete demise"), and Theodore C. Stamatakos, Note, The Doc-
trine of In Loco Parentis, Tort Liability and the Student-College Relationship, 65 INn. L.J. 471,
490 (1990) (rejecting the contention that in loco parentis is making a comeback).
146 See Hobbs v. Germany, 49 So. 515,517 (Miss. 1909) ("When the schoolroom is entered
by the pupil, the authority of the parent ceases, and that of the teacher begins," but "[w]hen sent
to his home, the authority of the teacher ends, and that of the parent begins.").
147 Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 115, 120 (1859).
148 Id. at 123; cf. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386,2397 (1995) (establishing
a "reasonable guardian" standard).
149 Lander, 32 Vt. at 124-25 (reasoning that whether whipping with rawhide is excessive is a
jury question, but noting that a schoolmaster has the advantage of being there to know all the
circumstances); see also Vanvactor v. State, 15 N.E. 341, 343 (Ind. 1888) ("[If the teacher] really
gave harder blows than ought to have been given, the error was one of judgment only .. ").
But see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 569-70, 582 (1975) (holding that a principal's direct observa-
tion of a student attacking a police officer did not alter due process requirements).
150 Massachusetts passed the first statewide compulsory attendance law in 1852. Mississippi
passed the last one in 1918. See C rtN, supra note 115, at 127.
151 See People v. Jackson, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731,736 (Sup. Ct. App. Term. 1971) (stating that in
loco parentis is "compelling in light of public necessity"), aff'd, 284 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1972); see
also Gonyaw v. Gray, 361 F. Supp. 366, 369 (D. Vt. 1973) ("Of necessity, parents must delegate
some disciplinary authority over their school children to the teachers .... ."); In re Donaldson, 75
Cal. Rptr. 220, 223 (CL App. 1969) ("The school stands in loco parentis and shares, in matters of
school discipline, the parent's right to use moderate force to obtain obedience and that right
extends to the search of the student's locker .... ") (citations omitted); Andreozzi v. Rubano,
141 A.2d 639, 641 (Conn. 1958) (stating that a teacher stands in loco parentis and must maintain
discipline); Calway v. Williamson, 36 A.2d 377, 378 (Conn. 1944) (stating that "[a] teacher in a
limited sense is in loco parentis over the pupil"); People v. Ball, 317 N.E.2d 54, 56 (I11. 1974)
(noting the Illinois statute providing that "[teachers] stand in the relation to parents and guardi-
ans of the pupils" in all matters relating to discipline and conduct); Mercer v. State, 450 S.W.2d
715, 717 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970, no writ) ("The principal in dealing with [the student] acted in loco
parentis, not for an arm of the government, when he demanded that [the student] disclose the
contents of his pockets."); McLean Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Andrews, 333 S.W.2d 886, 890-91 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1960, no writ) (justifying rulemaking authority in part based on in loco parentis).
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ment."'1 52 Nonetheless, the advent of compulsory school laws undercut the
theory that the parent was the source of the teacher's authority. 153 Commen-
tators and courts alike criticized the concept of parental delegation of author-
ity in a system of compulsory education in which neither parent nor child has
any choice in whether to attend school.'- 4 The criticism focused on the
source of the school power: "Under a system of compulsory education, a
school authority acquires power over the child directly by reason of the law
and solely because that authority is the agent of the governmental branch
charged with carrying out the law.' 55 Despite the theoretical difficulties re-
garding the source of teacher authority-whether it stemmed from the law of
the state156 or the delegation of the parent-teacher authority still was "most
often described in terms of its scope by the Latin phrase in loco parentis" and
interpreted to give the teacher "the right to discipline a child at school as a
parent would at home.' 15 7
2. Tinker and the Reconstruction Model
In Tinker the Supreme Court turned away from the in loco parentis doc-
trine and the social reproduction model that it represented. 58 Because the
Court saw reconstruction as the superior model, it needed to reconstruct the
school itself as an institution. To that end, the Court changed the rules sur-
rounding the school to fit the reconstruction norm.
The Tinker Court's opinion is rooted in the adversarial character of so-
cial reconstruction. For the Tinker Court, the public school institution was
152 Jackson, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 736.
153 If it is truly compulsory school laws that are the primary theoretical problem with the
concept of parental delegation of power, the advent of home schooling statutes may again allow
for the theory of parental delegation. See Amy Kaslow, Learning at Home, CHRIsTIAN ScI.
MorN-fOR, Feb. 26, 1996, at 9 (discussing statutes or case law in all 50 states that allow home
schooling). The parents who decide to educate their child at a school, rather than at home,
affirmatively choose to delegate the duty to educate and the concomitant parental power to
someone else. See infra notes 284-286 and accompanying text.
154 See School Bd. Dist. No. 18 v. Thompson, 103 P. 578, 581 (Okla. 1909) (questioning
whether the "mere act" of sending a child to school amounts to a delegation of parental author-
ity); Proehl, supra note 136, at 726-27 (arguing that when a parent sends a child to school be-
cause law so directs, the parent delegates no power to use corporal punishment and that the
validity of the in loco parentis doctrine has ceased).
155 William G. Buss, The Fourth Amendment and Searches of Students in Public Schools, 59
IOWA L. Rnv. 739, 767 (1974); see also McLeod v. Grant Co. School Dist. No. 128, 255 P.2d 360,
362 (Wash. 1953) (en banc) ("[T]he protective custody of teachers is mandatorily substituted for
that of the parent."); M.R. Sumption, The Control of Pupil Conduct by the School, 20 LAW &
CONTEMP. PRoNs. 80, 80 (1955) (arguing that the power to control the pupil is part of the power
of the state).
156 Some states confer teacher authority statutorily. See, eg., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 232.256(1)
(West 1989); 105 ILL. Comp. STAT. ArN. 5/34-84a (West 1993 & Supp. 1996); see also Goldstein,
supra note 136, at 384 n.44 (claiming it is unclear if legislation preempts in loco parentis author-
ity; cases that state that school boards have only powers statutorily granted to them exist along-
side cases that recognize an in loco parentis basis for school board authority).
157 Proehl, supra note 136, at 727 (footnotes omitted).
158 See Denno, supra note 5, at 60 (stating that a new meaning of public schools is evident
from the Tinker opinion); Senhauser, supra note 109, at 955 (stating that the Tinker Court im-
plicitly adopted a progressive philosophy).
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the enemy, the adversary. 59 Indeed, the Court declared that the "principal
use" of the schools is to "accommodate students.' 160 To avoid the danger
that artificial society would stifle the child and thus hinder social reconstruc-
tion,1 1 the Tinker Court held school authorities to a rigorous standard: they
may discipline students for speech activities only if they "materially and sub-
stantially" interfere with "appropriate discipline"'1 2 or if the school official
can reasonably forecast "substantial disruption of or material interference
with school activities."'1 3 This standard "implicitly rejected discipline in and
of itself" as a goal of education.164
To justify why the school should have the power to restrain student con-
duct only when it "materially or substantially" interferes with appropriate
discipline, the Court painted an ugly picture of what would happen without
the protection afforded by this standard. Put simply, the Supreme Court
warned the nation that its public schools-like those in Des Moines, Iowa-
were dealers in totalitarianism who wished to reproduce a society of ro-
bots.165 But despite the institution's attempts to impose conformity, "schools
may not be enclaves of totalitarianism," cautioned Justice Fortas.166 The
courts must intervene to protect the students from the totalitarians who
would claim "absolute authority over their students" as they try to confine
student expression to only those sentiments that are "officially approved."'167
The school's imposition of "absolute regimentation"'168 and its attempt to
treat students as "closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State
chooses to communicate"'1 9 must give way to the student's "silent passive
expression[s] of opinion"' 70 -the Deweyian impulse of the natural child.171
Given its perception of the public schools, the Court did not want to give
the school much power. Thus, it set forth a constitutional standard that,
although not as rigorous as that imposed on the state in other circumstances,
nonetheless shackled school officials who were attempting to keep "the disci-
plined atmosphere required for any classroom."'1 72
159 See Hafen, supra note 4, at 679 (noting how the counterculture of the 1960s "shook
public confidence in the schools and in traditional teaching methods by portraying the schools as
enemies of true learning and instrumentalities of social control").
160 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) (emphasis
added).
161 See supra notes 115-123 and accompanying text.
162 7mker, 393 U.S. at 509.
163 Id. at 514. Compare the Court's standard with the standard set forth by the district
court: whether "a disturbance in school discipline is reasonably to be anticipated." Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971, 973 (S.D. Iowa 1966), aff'd, 383 F.2d 988 (8th
Cir. 1967), rev'd, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
164 Senhauser, supra note 109, at 957.
165 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 508.
169 Id. at 511.
170 Id. at 508.
171 Compare the Court's description here with that of the social reconstruction model,
supra notes 111-123 and accompanying text.
172 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971, 973 (S.D. Iowa 1966), aff'd,
383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 393 U.S. 503 (1969). Indeed, one commentator went so far as
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That the Tinker Court was receptive to social reconstruction over social
reproduction and liberty over order is not surprising given the social and
political context. Tinker was written at a time when people-particularly
young people-hoped they could reconstruct a better society. In the process,
they questioned "not only the legitimacy but the very concept of author-
ity."'173 Many challenged and some rejected altogether the authority of cul-
ture, of morality, and of law.174 Tinker was decided in 1969, only five years
after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964175 and in the midst of angry
protests about the Vietnam War. "Order" was one of the values, along with
respect, deference, and even trust, that was being challenged at all levels of
consciousness. In an era that has been compared to the Protestant Reforma-
tion,176 the moral authority of institutions that had heretofore been virtually
unquestioned crumbled, and public schools did not escape the onslaught.
Brown v. Board of Education177 and its progeny had thrust upon the
public schools the biggest social reconstruction problem of all: the eradica-
tion of racism.178 The fight for integration exposed the ugly sore of racism on
the underbelly of the public schools and the school boards that ran them.179
Although the quality of our nation's public schools was questioned after the
Soviet Union launched Sputnik in 1957, the character of the institution was
questioned during school desegregation. 180 Rather than an institution in
which traditional values like "respect" and "order" helped to reproduce a
to state that after Tinker, students are protected until "open interruption within classrooms"
occurs or students "'undertake incitement to riot' or similar overt action." Denno, supra note 5,
at 55 (quoting Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951)).
173 CmARLEs E. SILBERMAN, CRISIS IN THE CLASSROoM: THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN
EDUCATION 24 (1970). Sociologist Robert A. Nisbet has asserted that the most dangerous intel-
lectual aspect of the 1960s was the refusal "to distinguish between authority and power." Robert
A. Nisbet, The Twilight of Authority, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, Spring 1969, at 3, 5, quoted in
SILBERMAN, supra, at 25. One was viewed as being as much a threat to liberty as the other-a
view Nisbet called "madness," for "[t]here can be no possible freedom in society apart from
authority." Id. Nisbet contended that authority is "built into the very fabric of human associa-
tion," stemming from the relationships and loyalties of the members of a group-family, church,
school or state-and derived from the function that group or institution performs. Id. There
also exists authority of "learning and taste; of syntax and grammar in language; of scholarship, of
science, and of the arts." Id. "Above all, there is the residual authority of the core of values
around which Western culture has been formed," including the values of "justice, reason, equity,
liberty, [and] charity." Id.
174 See SILBERMAN, supra note 173, at 26; see also Hafen, supra note 4, at 676-77 (noting
the "profound change in overall social attitudes that shattered public confidence" in public
schools).
175 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-d,
2000a to 2000h-6 (1994)).
176 See SILBERMAN, supra note 173, at 27 (quoting Paul Goodman, The New Reformation,
N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 14, 1969, at 32, 33).
177 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
178 See Hafen, supra note 4, at 676 (calling school desegregation in mid-1950s "the heaviest
social burden the public schools had yet been asked to bear").
179 See Edward T. Ladd, Allegedly Disruptive Student Behavior and the Legal Authority of
School Officials, 19 J. PUB. L. 209, 227-28 (1970) (discussing loss of trust in school officials and
school boards because of their attempts to evade implementing Brown).
180 See Kevin Brown, Has the Supreme Court Allowed the Cure for De Jure Segregation to
Replicate the Disease?, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 73 (1992) (stating that the Court's de jure segre-
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virtuous society, the public school was a battleground in which many school
officials' views of "tradition" and "order" were perceived as a way of further-
ing discrimination and bigotry.
Even so, the Tinker majority could not simply eradicate the social repro-
duction model. Both of the Tinker dissents embraced social reproduction as
the appropriate model for the public school and eschewed the notion of the
school as adversary. In separate opinions, the Tinker dissenters, Justice
Black and Justice Harlan, recognized that the school officials in Des Moines
had been motivated by the "legitimate school concern[ ]" that the protest
would distract students from their studies.18' Justice Black pointed out that
the armbands did exactly what the school principals had feared: they allowed
students to defy orders of teachers and diverted the students' minds from
their studies to the "highly emotional subject of the Vietnam war.' 18 2 Justice
Black had no use for the cornerstone of the social reconstruction model,
Dewey's notion that the school should be guided by the impulse of the natu-
ral child.18 3 For Justice Black, children are sent to school "to learn, not
teach."'184 Instead of focusing on the Deweyian concept of the purer interest
of the child, Black espoused the "original idea of schools" that was the es-
sence of the reproduction model: "that children had not yet reached the point
of experience and wisdom which enabled them to teach all of their elders.' 85
In Justice Black's view, the child must be molded; the school and the student
have a concurrent mission-the social reproduction mission-in the training
of children "to be good citizens-to be better citizens."'18 6 Reconstruction
was not always the best solution to a problem, for although "[c]hange has
been said to be truly the law of life ... sometimes the old and the tried and
true are worth holding."' 87 Unlike the majority, which viewed school author-
ity as an enemy of liberty, Justice Black saw "uncontrollable liberty" as an
"enemy to domestic peace."'188 According to Justice Black, the school acts,
not as an adversary, but instead helps the child to find his place in society
while "giving us tranquility and ... making us a more law-abiding people."'18 9
3. In the Shade of Tinker: The Reconstruction Motif
Thus the battle lines were drawn. In the opinions that followed Tinker,
the Court, in cases like Fraser, sometimes tried to retreat from the strong
reconstruction theme set forth in Tinker. But the strains of Tinker can be
heard in every Supreme Court opinion regarding the school's power to keep
order; that is, every opinion until Acton.
gation jurisprudence "has had profound impact on professional educators' beliefs about
education").
181 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 526 (1969) (Harlan,
J., dissenting); see id. at 518 (Black, J., dissenting).
182 Id. at 518 (Black, J., dissenting).
183 See id. at 522 (Black, J., dissenting).
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 524.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id.
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The school order case following Tinker, Goss v. Lopez,190 was also
greatly influenced by the reconstruction model. Once again the Court ad-
justed school disciplinary rules to fit the reconstruction norm. In deciding
that the student must receive only "some kind of notice and some kind of
hearing,"'19 Goss appears at first blush to be somewhat deferential to school
authorities. Justice White, writing for the majority, was aware of the volume
of disciplinary suspensions that occurred in schools. 192 He performed a cost-
benefit analysis and announced that to "impose in each such case even trun-
cated trial-type procedures might well overwhelm administrative facilities...
and, by diverting resources, cost more than it would save in educational
effectiveness."'193
But even as the Court stated how application of the Due Process Clause
was an "intensely practical matter[ ]" and that intervention in the public
school system required "'care and restraint,' "194 the opinion-like Tinker-
revealed that the Court viewed teachers and principals as adversaries of the
students, consistent with the reconstruction model. "In short, the Goss ma-
jority elevate[d] to constitutional status a particular view of how public
school officials should relate to their students."'195 Many at the time feared
the damage done to the public schools would not be easily remedied. 96
The Goss majority purported to be concerned about "unfair or mistaken
exclusion from the educational process,"'197 an interest that trumped the
school's interest in maintaining order. Yet even when the school principal
himself witnessed the severe misconduct, as he did in Goss, the Court was
unwilling to concede that the principal could fairly ascertain what had oc-
curred.198 Despite witnessing the severe misconduct leading to the suspen-
sion, "[t]hings are not always as they seem to be" to the school-principal-as-
witness, 199 and the school principal could not be trusted to understand fully
an event that occurred in an auditorium full of people.200 Even during this
time of "great difficulty" 20 and "widespread student unrest, ''202 he may not
190 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
191 ld. at 579 (emphasis omitted).
192 See id. at 583 (stating that "[b]rief disciplinary suspensions are almost countless").
193 Id.
194 Id. at 578 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
195 Kirp, supra note 12, at 851.
196 See J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, Goss v. Lopez: The Supreme Court as School Superinten-
dent, 1975 Sup. CT. REv. 25, 63 (cautioning that the Court's recent decisions had done damage to
public schools that would not be "easily repaired or reversed").
197 Goss, 419 U.S. at 579.
198 See id. at 584; see also Kirp, supra note 12, at 860 ("Goss signals an erosion of the
confidence which has historically been placed in the fairness (if not the rightness) of [school
officials'] decisions and the supplanting of a relationship based on trust with one adversarial in
nature.") (footnote omitted).
199 Goss, 419 U.S. at 584.
200 See id. at 569,584. But cf Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 526 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that it would be more appropriate to place the
burden on those complaining to show that actions of school officials were motivated by other
than legitimate school concerns).
201 Goss, 419 U.S. at 581 n.9.
202 Id. at 569.
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act swiftly and decisively without giving the student "the opportunity to char-
acterize his conduct and put it in what [the student] deems the proper
context." 20 3
Like the Tinker Court, which viewed public schools-absent court su-
pervision-as enclaves of totalitarianism, the Goss Court explained why
courts needed to intervene in school discipline. Although school principals
would prefer "untrammeled power to act unilaterally," courts must ensure
that "an injustice is not done. '20 4 Without courts to ensure fairness, teachers
and principals-acting in the adversarial role-would likely make "secret,
one-sided," "self-righteous" determinations of facts regarding student
discipline.20 5
Given this mistrust of the school as an institution, the Goss Court set a
high standard, comparable to that in Tinker, before it would allow the school
to discipline students unilaterally. Although the Court acknowledged that
the educational function of the school made at least "[s]ome modicum of
discipline and order" 20 6 essential to the school community, only a student
whose presence poses a "continuing danger" or an "ongoing threat" to the
school community could be removed immediately from school.20 7 In short,
the underlying message of Tinker, that teachers are the students' adversaries,
was endorsed by the Goss Court. The Goss Court also reinforced the Tinker
theme that defiance of those who try to stifle the mission of reconstruction
would be rewarded by the courts.
Despite the sharp tone of Tinker and Goss and the domination of the
reconstructionists, the reproductionists still had a voice. Perhaps the strong-
est advocate for reproduction was Justice Powell who, even as the reconstruc-
tion model reached its zenith, pressed to restore the supremacy of the
reproduction model. In his dissent in Goss and his majority opinion in Ingra-
ham two years later, he contended that school discipline and order should be
based on the reproduction model.208 These opinions set an example for later
Justices who would try to retreat from the force field of Tinker.
203 Id. at 584; see also Kirp, supra note 12, at 852 ("The majority opinion may not have
adopted what John Dewey termed a 'democratic' model of school governance in which decision-
making is a shared responsibility, but its position differs markedly from the widely prevalent
hierarchical model, which treats students as the recipients of commands.") (footnote omitted).
204 Goss, 419 U.S. at 580; see Note, Due Process, Due Politics and Due Respect: Three Mod-
els of Legitimate School Governance, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1106, 1121 (1981) (noting the distrust of
school officials evident in Goss).
205 Goss, 419 U.S. at 580 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Compare iL
(viewing student input into factual disputes as helpful), with Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435
U.S. 78, 87-88 (opinion of the Court), 95 n.5 (Powell, J., concurring) (1978) (viewing student
input into academic judgments that involve at least some questions of "objectively determinable
fact" as unnecessary). See also Note, supra note 204, at 1117-18 (discussing the Court's treat-
ment of factual questions in academic and disciplinary dismissals).
206 Goss, 419 U.S. at 580.
207 Id. at 582-83 (cautioning that notice and hearing should follow as soon as practicable).
208 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 676 (1977) (balancing the student's interest in
personal security and the "traditional view" of education); Goss, 419 U.S. at 594 & nn. 12-13
(Powell, J., dissenting) (characterizing the teacher-student relationship as nonadversarial). Jus-
tice Powell served as chairman of both the Richmond School Board and the Virginia State Board
of Education. See JoniN C. JmEnFms, JR, JusTicE LEwis F. POWELL, JR. 2 (1994).
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Justice Powell respected the child, but was not enamored of the child's
inherent superiority over adults. He pointed out that the "experience of
mankind, as well as the long history of our law, recogniz[es] that there are
differences which must be accommodated in determining the rights and du-
ties of children as compared with those of adults. '209 Rather than allow the
child to reconstruct adult institutions, the function of adult institutions like
family, church, and school was to shape the character of the child. Justice
Powell vehemently disagreed with the Deweyian view that adult authority in
school-the teacher-becomes "the threat to the child. '210 Instead, Justice
Powell saw the interest of the school and the interests of the pupil as "essen-
tially congruent."21' In his view, the school is not the student's adversary but
an ally that acts both for the student's benefit and for the public generally.
Justice Powell viewed the public school as the institution where the state
and the people come together to accomplish a shared mission: to teach their
youngest members the good citizen's responsibility under the social compact
of our democratic government.212 Because of the commonality of interests
between the State and the public school system, Justice Powell chastised the
Court for thinking in the "traditional judicial terms of an adversary situa-
tion. '2 13 In so doing, he argued that the Court both ignored the larger con-
gruent interests of state and student and "misapprehend[ed] the reality of the
normal teacher-pupil relationship. '214 Far from the "totalitarian"215 acting
with "untrammeled power" in making "secret" "self-righteous" determina-
tions, 216 Justice Powell conjured "warm memories" 217 of teachers and
stressed the teacher's "good faith[,J dedication"218 and "commitment" 219 to
students.
To the reproductionist, order is not incompatible with individual liberty.
Indeed, order is essential to the individual interest of the student in obtaining
a "meaningful" education. In stark contrast to Dewey and those who viewed
the public school's mission as social reconstruction, Justice Powell, as a strong
proponent of the social reproduction model, viewed conformity-at least
conformity to school discipline-as "an integral and important part of train-
ing our children to be good citizens." 220
209 Goss, 419 U.S. at 590-91 (Powell, J., dissenting).
210 HOFSTADTER, supra note 115, at 383.
211 Goss, 419 U.S. at 591 (Powell, J., dissenting).
212 See id. at 593 (Powell, J., dissenting) (stating that at student must understand the "mean-
ing and necessity of discipline" as it pertains not only to the "shaping of his own character," but
also as it provides the student an "understanding of the relevance to the social compact of re-
spect for the rights of others").
213 Id. at 593-94 (Powell, J., dissenting).
214 Id. at 594 (Powell, J., dissenting).
215 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
216 Goss, 419 U.S. at 580.
217 Id. at 594 n.12 (Powell, J., dissenting).
218 Id. at 595 (Powell, J., dissenting).
219 Id. at 595 n.14 (Powell, J., dissenting).
220 Id. at 593 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 524 (Black, J., dissenting))
(internal quotation marks omitted). Dewey and those who subscribed to the social reconstruc-
tion-adversarial model saw conformity as "arising only from adult society and from its surrogate,
the teacher." HOFSTADTER, supra note 115, at 382. Dewey abhorred conformity because it led
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Although Justice Powell's view did not prevail in the 5-4 decision in
Goss, only two years later, in Ingraham v. Wright,22 1 he was able to convince
one more member of the Court 22 that-based on his reproductionist view of
the public school as an institution-schools should be allowed the power to
paddle students unconstrained by the Eighth Amendment or the Due Pro-
cess Clause.'- In contrast to the image created by previous decisions of an
"enclave[ ] of totalitarianism"''224 acting in secret, Justice Powell expanded the
theme he began in his Goss dissent that education in the public schools was a
shared enterprise. The public school is not a secret enclave, but an "open
institution" from which students freely return home at the end of every
school day. Moreover, students have the support of family and friends
while at school, as well as that of teachers and other pupils.- 6 Unlike the
majorities in Tinker and Goss, both of which assumed that without court in-
tervention students would likely be harmed by their teachers, Justice Powell
trusted teachers. He maintained that mistreatment like that claimed by the
plaintiffs in Ingraham was an "aberration."'' 27 And, unlike the Goss Court,
which did not trust the school principal's immediate suspension of students
for gross misconduct, Justice Powell essentially stated that, most of the time if
a child is paddled for conduct directly observed by the teacher, he probably
deserved it.228 In contrast to Goss and Tinker, the Ingraham majority ex-
pressed its confidence that teachers would usually restrain students in good
faith and because of legitimate school concerns.2 9 This pronouncement was
the first time a majority of the Court had made such a strong statement in
support of order in public schools since Tinker. Thus, given this faith in
teachers and the presence of additional safeguards-the openness of the
school and the supervision by the community-the student would not suffer
due to reduced constitutional protection. 30 Instead, the processes of com-
to "aversion to progress, and dread of the uncertain and the unknown." Id. at 383 (quoting
DEWEY, supra note 113, at 60) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, both conformity and
the institutions that inculcated conformist habits like the schools should be challenged.
221 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
222 Justice Stewart changed sides between Goss and Ingraham. Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist sided with Justice Powell in both decisions.
223 See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 683. In 1975 the Court affirmed, without opinion, a three-
judge district court panel ruling that the state's interest in maintaining order was sufficient to
sustain the right of teachers and school officials to administer reasonable corporal punishment
for disciplinary purposes despite parental objection. See Baker v. Owen, 423 U.S. 907 (1975),
aff'g 395 F. Supp. 294, 301 (M.D.N.C. 1975).
224 inker, 393 U.S. at 511.
225 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 670.
226 See id. In addition, many schools have guidance counselors, nurses, and parent volun-
teers who may witness and protest instances of mistreatment.
227 l at 677.
228 See id. at 677-78.
229 See id. at 678; cf. 7inker, 393 U.S. at 526 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that it would be
more appropriate to place the burden on those complaining to show that the school officials'
action was motivated by other than legitimate school concerns).
230 See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 678 & n.46, Justice Powell was referring to the Eighth
Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual punishment. See id at 670. Justice Powell
also emphasized that Fourteenth Amendment due process concerns were satisfied by the state's
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munity debate and legislative action would address the issue better than
Court intervention.
The division between TinkerlGoss and Ingraham was a stark one, both in
substance and in tone. It was based on two divergent conceptions about the
public school as an institution. Ingraham was undoubtedly a victory for those
who would give public schools greater power to effectuate the mission of
social reproduction. Indeed, Ingraham is perhaps, at least until Acton, the
opinion that is most solicitous of school power. But it must have confused
those educators who were responsible for the day-to-day operation of the
school. After all, just two years after Goss had declared-in a 5-4 vote-that
school officials could not suspend a student without notice and a hearing, the
Ingraham Court determined-in another 5-4 vote-that it is permissible to
paddle a child with no procedural safeguards. After Ingraham, it became
more obvious than ever that the Court was reeling back and forth between
social reconstruction and social reproduction and that the perceived need for
school power based on the proclivity of any five Justices would decide the
fate of our nation's public schools. School officials might take some comfort
from the tone of the Ingraham opinion, but with Goss and Ingraham each
hanging by a 5-4 vote, teachers and principals trying to carry on each day
could only guess at the direction the Court would take in future cases.
In New Jersey v. T.L.O.23 1 the Court continued to send conflicting
messages because of its struggle to come to grips with school power. At one
level T.L.O. appears to be a strong reconstructionist opinion. Indeed, it at-
tempted to extinguish the main weapon in the reproduction arsenal-the in
loco parentis doctrine. Before T.L.O. the lower courts were deeply split re-
garding how the in loco parentis doctrine affected searches at school.23 2 The
Court relied on its most fervent reconstruction opinions, Tinker and Goss, to
resolve the conflict in the lower courts and to repudiate in loco parentis. Ac-
cording to the Court, the in loco parentis doctrine was "in tension with con-
temporary reality" and with Court precedent holding that school officials
were "state actors" in Tinker and Goss.233 Many courts and commentators
agreed that the T.L.0. Court, together with the long arm of Tinker, had snuf-
fed out in loco parentis.23 4 The Acton Court would show that they were
wrong.
preservation and codification of common law constraints and remedies regarding corporal pun-
ishment. See id. at 674-80.
231 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
232 See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
233 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336. The Court further stated that, given Tinker and Goss, it was
"difficult to understand" why school authorities "should be deemed to be exercising parental
rather than public authority" when conducting school searches. Id. Moreover, the T.L.O. Court
emphasized a theoretical problem that had been acknowledged in Ingraham: "'the concept of
parental delegation' as a source of school authority is not entirely 'consonant with compulsory
education laws.'" Id. (quoting Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 662).
234 See, e.g., Anable v. Ford, 653 F. Supp. 22, 38 (W.D. Ark.) (observing that the T.L.O.
Court "rejected the notion that school officials act in loco parentis in their dealings with stu-
dents"), remedy modified, 663 F. Supp. 149 (W.D. Ark. 1985); Martin R. Gardner, Student Pri-
vacy in the Wake of T.L.O.: An Appeal for an Individualized Suspicion Requirement for Valid
Searches and Seizures in the Schools, 22 GA. L. REv. 897, 912-13 (1988) (stating that the T.L.O.
Court rejected the concept of educators assuming essentially parental roles); Robert J. Goodwin,
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Despite this blow to in loco parentis, certain concepts animated the sub-
text of the T.L.O. opinion that were inconsistent with the reconstruction
theme. Once the Court decided that school officials were subject to the
Fourth Amendment, the Court still needed to determine where on the school
power continuum the school's power to search begins and the protection of
the Fourth Amendment ends. Ten years had passed since Goss. The Court
now perceived the need for school power in the light cast by the rising tide of
chaos in schools. The Court pointed out that "maintaining order in the class-
room [had] never been easy, but [that] in recent years, school disorder has
often taken particularly ugly forms: drug use and violent crime in the schools
have become major social problems."23 5 Because of the precipitous decline
in school discipline and the very serious issues facing school officials, the
need for power to keep order was great.23 6 Even in 1985 it was starting to
become evident to some Justices that public schools were in trouble. Implicit
in the Court's recognition of the effect of student drug use and crime on the
educational process was the dawning recognition-a recognition that grated
against Tinker and the social reconstruction model-that public school stu-
dents must conform to the social order. It was hard to keep an image of the
pure school child leading society's reformation when the child keeps others
from obtaining a serious education and begins to look like an oppressor him-
self.237 Thus, although the Court was unwilling to say that school officials
have all the power of a parent when searching students, the Court was also
unwilling to constrain teachers with the warrant and probable cause standard
usually required of the State.
The Fifth Amendment in Public Schools: A Rationale for Its Application in Investigations and
Disciplinary Proceedings, 28 WM. & MARY L. REv. 683, 690-91 (1987) (stating that the Court
"put to rest" use of in loco parentis in Fourth Amendment context "once and for all"); Robert
Berkley Harper, School Searches-A Look into the 21st Century, 13 Miss. C. L. REv. 293, 294
(1993) (stating that the T.L.O. Court decided that "the common law doctrine of in loco parentis
has no application to public school officials conducting searches of students"); Betsy Levin, Edu-
cating Youth for Citizenship: The Conflict Between Authority and Individual Rights in the Public
School, 95 YALE L.J. 1647, 1671 (1986) (asserting that the notion that teachers are in loco paren-
tis "is no longer a viable one" after T.L.O.); Stephen Faberman, Note, The Lessons of DeShaney:
Special Relationships, Schools & the Fifth Circuit, 35 B.C. L. REv. 97, 132-33 (1993) (observing
that the T.L.O. court rejected the in loco parentis doctrine); The Supreme Court, 1984 Term-
Leading Cases, 99 HARv. L. Rnv. 120,235 n.13 (1985) (noting the T.L.O. Court's rejection of in
loco parentis).
235 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339. The Court also took judicial notice of the difficulty of maintain-
ing discipline in the public schools "today." Id. at 338. The Solicitor General's Amicus Brief
supporting the school had informed the Court of "the extent to which the disorder in the na-
tion's public schools now transcends the traditional difficulties of focusing a child's attention on
learning." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 22, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325 (1985) (No. 83-712) (citing to statistics on violence from a 1978 study by the National Insti-
tute of Education), available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File. The Solicitor General in-
formed the Court that many schools "are in such a state of disorder that the very safety of
students and teachers is imperiled." Id. at 7.
236 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 352-53 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (pointing out
that due to increased drug use and possession of weapons at school, teachers need to be able to
respond to problems quickly, not only to preserve the education environment, but to protect the
safety of students and school personnel).
237 The Court observed that although prisoners had no legitimate expectation of privacy, it
was not yet ready to hold that schools and prisons need be equated. See id. at 338.
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At first the T. L. 0. school power determination may seem like a reprise
of Tinker and Goss. Nonetheless, there are hints in the majority opinion that
the T.L. 0. reasonable suspicion standard, although resting somewhere in the
middle of the school power continuum, is of a different ilk than Tinker's
"substantial disruption" standard23 8 or Goss's "continuing danger" stan-
dard.23 9 For example, Justice White, the author of Goss, was now willing to
admit that school officials might be capable of reaching common-sense con-
clusions about the behavior of the students whom they deal with every day.
In T.L.O., a teacher saw a student smoking in a school lavatory. The assis-
tant vice principal did not witness the smoking but based on the teacher's
report, he searched the student's bag for cigarettes. Justice White allowed
that the principal was acting based on a "'common-sense conclusio[n] about
human behavior' upon which 'practical people' . . . are entitled to rely. 240
Gone was the palpable mistrust of school officials so evident in Goss; gone
was the idea that school principals, even if they personally witnessed obvious
misconduct, were unable to make a reasoned judgment about what hap-
pened. Gone too was the Court's concern in Goss that school officials would
discipline students unjustly if they acted in response to the reports of others,
like the teacher who reported T.L.O. for smoking.241
The disagreement between Justice Stevens and the majority about the
importance of school rules is further evidence that the Court was slipping
away just a bit from the reconstruction force field that, except in parts of
Ingraham, had held it in tow since Tinker. Echoing Tinker's substantial dis-
ruption standard, Justice Stevens would have allowed school officials the
power to search a student only under limited circumstances: when there is
reason to believe that the search will uncover evidence that the student was
either violating the law or engaging in conduct "seriously disruptive of school
order."242 Justice Stevens, in keeping with the adversarial character of the
reconstruction model, believed that teachers must not be trusted to make
their own determination whether the repercussions from student misconduct
might be a sufficiently serious threat to school discipline to warrant a search.
The majority stressed, however, that it did not endorse Justice Stevens'
view that some rules regarding student conduct were too trivial to justify a
search based on reasonable suspicion.243 Instead, the majority stated that a
search by a teacher or school official "will be 'justified at its inception' when
there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evi-
dence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules
of the school."244 Leaning away from the adversarial character of the recon-
238 See supra notes 162-163 and accompanying text.
239 See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
240 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 346 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)).
241 See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975) (cautioning that the risk of error when
school officials act on reports of others is not trivial, and "it should be guarded against if that
may be done without prohibitive cost or interference with the educational process").
242 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 378 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (emphasis
omitted).
243 See id. at 342 n.9.
244 ld. at 341-42 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)) (footnote omitted). The
Court added that "[sluch a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are
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struction model here, the Court was willing to trust school officials to evalu-
ate fairly what conduct is destructive of school order without judicial
interference. Moreover, the Court correctly recognized, as it had not in
Tinker, that "[t]he maintenance of discipline in the schools requires not only
that students be restrained from assaulting one another [and] abusing drugs
and alcohol .... but also that students conform themselves to the standards of
conduct prescribed by school authorities." 245 In essence the T.L.O. Court
signalled that at least in the school search context, it trusted those who
worked in schools every day to better discern the importance of school rules
than judges in far-off courtrooms. The reproduction model once more found
its strongest voice in Justice Powell, whose concurrence again stressed that,
unlike the adversarial picture presented in the reconstruction model, teachers
and students share in the institutional mission: "the education and training of
young people."246 Because maintaining order is essential to both school and
student in this shared enterprise, it is in both the student's and the school's
interest. Like Justice Powell, Justice Blackmun's focus on the school as a
"special" institution with a "special need for flexibility"247 reveals his affinity
for the reproduction model. Significantly, Justice Blackmun observed that
within that "special" institution, teachers did not act as adversaries of the
student but instead focused on the nonadversarial tasks of "teaching and
helping" students.248
Despite the loss of parental-like authority to search students without
Fourth Amendment restrictions, the T.L.O. majority nonetheless allowed
public schools more power to search school children than the State is gener-
ally allowed. In addition, the ability to act on a reasonable suspicion that a
student is violating a school rule arguably allows schools the discretion to act
to maintain order sooner than the material interference or ongoing threat
standards of Tinker and Goss. Thus, the T.L.O. Court, while not going as far
as Ingraham, was not as restrictive as Tinker and Goss. Most significantly,
underlying the T.L.O. Court's sometimes confusing analysis of school power
is the Court's as yet only vague notion that the opportunity to obtain a seri-
ous education in many of our nation's public schools was eroding at an alarm-
ing rate in the face of judicial involvement in school discipline.
The truth of Justice Black's prediction that Tinker transferred the power
to control student behavior from the school to the Supreme Court was never
more evident than in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser.249 It took three
years of litigation before the Supreme Court finally allowed the school to
reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age
and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction." Id. at 342 (footnote omitted).
245 Id. at 342 n.9.
246 Id. at 350 (Powell, J., concurring).
247 Id. at 352 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
248 ld. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
249 478 U.S. 675 (1986); see James C. Dever, III, Note, Tinker Revisited: Fraser v. Bethel
School District and Regulation of Speech in the Public Schools, 1985 DuKE L.J. 1164, 1167-68
(documenting examples of students using Tinker "to challenge the actions of public school au-
thorities concerning dances, demonstrations, discipline, student body elections, school searches,
hair length, library books, movies, school plays, prayer meetings, textbook selection and school
newspapers") (footnotes omitted).
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impose a disciplinary sanction on Matthew Fraser for the nomination speech
he gave at a school assembly.25 0
Although Chief Justice Burger attempted to distinguish the armbands in
Tinker from Fraser's speech by pointing out that the armbands were a polit-
ical message, the Fraser majority appeared to be retreating from Tinker, in
essence saying, "if this is what is happening in the schools because of Tinker,
we've gone too far." Indeed, the majority opinion in Fraser cited part of
Justice Black's dissent in Tinker as "especially relevant."25'
Like Justice Powell, Chief Justice Burger eschewed the adversarial com-
ponent of the reconstruction model. Instead, parents, teachers, students, in-
deed the entire community, share in the enterprise-the education process-
to maintain social order.25 2 Again, the school's mission of social reproduc-
tion informs the Court's assessment of the school's need for power: schools
need the power to restrain those students who would inhibit the school's in-
culcation of the manners of civility.25 3 By allowing school officials that
power, the Court sent a significant message that at least in some contexts, it
trusted school teachers and principals to determine whether certain expres-
sion was sufficiently harmful to its reproductive mission to merit discipline.
Indeed the Court, without any mention of T.L.0., even mentioned in loco
parentis with approval, noting the "concern on the part of parents, and school
250 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. Note the reconstruction motif in the Ninth
Circuit opinion:
We fear that if school officials had the unbridled discretion to apply a standard as
subjective and elusive as indecency in controlling the speech of high school stu-
dents, it would increase the risk of cementing white, middle-class standards for de-
termining what is acceptable and proper speech and behavior in our public schools.
Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356, 1363 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 478 U.S. 675
(1986).
251 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 686. "I wish therefore.... to disclaim any purpose ... to hold that
the Federal Constitution compels the teachers, parents, and elected school officials to surrender
control of the American public school system to public school students." Id at 686 (quoting
Timker, 393 U.S. at 526 (Black, J., dissenting)).
252 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681; see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 593-94 (1975) (chastis-
ing the majority for thinking of the school's relationship to students in "traditional judicial terms
of an adversary situation") (Powell, J., dissenting).
253 Justice Stevens had remarked on the inculcative role of the public school in his dissent
in T.L.O. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 468 U.S. 325, 373 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part). He observed that "[s]chools are places where we inculcate the values essen-
tial to the meaningful exercise of rights and responsibilities by a self-governing citizenry." ld.
(footnote omitted). He focused in particular on the value of personal liberty, stressing that if
students can be convicted through the use of arbitrary methods destructive of personal liberty,
they will feel that they have been dealt with unfairly. See id. at 373-74 (footnote omitted).
In Fraser, Chief Justice Burger also stressed the inculcative role and purpose of public
schools. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681 (citation omitted). But instead of stressing personal liberty
as the value that was "necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system," id., Chief
Justice Burger emphasized the inculcation of the "habits and manners of civility," id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted), the "shared values of civilized social order," id. at 683,
and the "essential lessons of civil, mature conduct." Id. He expressed dismay over the effect the
speech had on teachers and other students, in essence, subordinating Fraser's right to expression
to the rights of others in the community. See id. at 683-84. The school's role in "teach[ing] by
example the shared values of a civilized social order" gave the school the power to disassociate
itself from a student who showed such disregard for civility. Id.
[Vol 65:49
HeinOnline -- 65 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.  84 1996-1997
Keeping Order in Public Schools
authorities acting in loco parentis, to protect children... from exposure to
sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech. 25 4
Following the pattern described above, the Hazelwood Court again used
the reproduction and reconstruction models to determine how much power a
school needs to control expression that is "disseminated under its auspices"
in a school newspaper. 25 5 A majority of the Hazelwood Court, like the Fraser
Court, embraced the social reproduction model and based its assessment of
the need for power on the commonality of interest between student, school,
and community. Because publishing the newspaper was a "supervised learn-
ing experience 25 6 that was "part of the school curriculum," 25 7 the Court
readily observed that the student and the school were bound up together in
effectuating the school's mission. Thus, the school ought to have the power
to "disassociate itself"' 25 8 from student speech that may affect public percep-
tion of the social reproduction mission: inculcating the "shared values of a
civilized social order." 25 9 The Court viewed the activity in question in Hazel-
wood-a paper produced in a journalism class-as pedagogical. Thus, edu-
cators, rather than students or courts, should have the power to control the
activity without heavy constraints. The Court accordingly allowed school of-
ficials power over the content of student speech in school-sponsored expres-
sive activities if the school control is "reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns. '260 This standard-this "rank" on the school power
continuum-was, without doubt, different from the substantial disruption
standard that the Tinker Court had set for student expression. The asserted
distinction between Tinker and FraserlHazelwood was that Tinker involved
personal expression that the school merely tolerated.261 Because the expres-
sion in Tinker was not promoted by the school, it would not affect the com-
munity's view of the school mission, and the school did not need the power to
control that expression. The need for power in Hazelwood depended on the
need to control the message to the community rather than the need to pre-
vent disruption, and the Court changed the standard for allowing schools
power as the need changed. Thus, the place where the Court placed school
control on the school power continuum was different in Hazelwood and
Tinker, even though both cases dealt with student expression.262
254 Id. at 684. Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment, but stressed that the school
could discipline Fraser not because the speech was vulgar, but because school officials concluded
it was disruptive. See id. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Marshall
refused to accept the statements of teachers and administrators who witnessed the speech and
claimed that it was disruptive. See id. at 690 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
255 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988).
256 Id. at 270.
257 Id. at 271.
258 Id. at 266 (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685) (internal quotation marks omitted).
259 Id. at 272 (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683) (internal quotation marks omitted).
260 Id. at 273 (footnote omitted).
261 See id. at 270-71.
262 Justice Brennan and the dissenters endorsed the reconstruction model and would have
set a different standard-closer to Tinker-on the school power continuum. The dissenters did
not believe school officials needed the power to restrain student expression unless it" 'materially
disrupt[ed]' a legitimate curricular function." Id. at 283 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513). Justice Brennan defined that function narrowly as the "skills" the
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Divergent views of the purpose of the school paper drove the power
assessment in Hazelwood. The majority viewed the school newspaper as part
of the school's curriculum, so the school needed the power to limit the educa-
tional messages that were circulated. Without the power to limit the educa-
tional message, students may not learn what they should from the course, an
improper educational message may be sent to other students (in this case,
that it is permissible to trample on privacy rights or have irresponsible sex),
and the other pupils and the community at large may think that the school
endorses the inappropriate message.
The dissenters, resounding with the reconstruction model's view of the
child struggling against society's values, viewed the newspaper as a forum in
which the students may rebut the values that schools are attempting to incul-
cate. Because the child must reconstruct corrupt society and lead it to a
newer and better place, the child must have the power to do so. Thus, the
school should have no greater power than the student who wishes to discredit
the values that the school deems essential to its reproductive mission.
4. Out of the Shade of Tinker: A New School Power Paradigm
The Court could have gone on in this manner-moving back and forth
on the school power continuum based on the Justices' everchanging views
regarding the reconstruction and reproduction models. But the Court recast
the analysis of school power in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton. 63 In-
stead of arguing about the "special characteristics" of the school that may or
may not allow for a certain amount of power on the school power continuum,
the Acton Court simply set forth the very nature of the power the school
possesses, and pronounced that the power is broad and deep.
As the Court described the facts, teachers and administrators in
Vernonia, Oregon saw disciplinary referrals more than double in the late
course was designed to teach. Id. at 284 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent further stated that
the principal's decision could not possibly have been based on any "lesson" involving responsible
journalism. Id. at 285 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan did not dispute outright that
the principal reasonably could have concluded that one of the deleted articles did not sufficiently
protect the anonymity of the pregnant girls discussed. Indeed, Justice Brennan could not: a
teacher had testified that she could identify at least one girl. See id at 274. Instead, Justice
Brennan was more concerned that the publishing students did not receive an explanation from
the principal before the newspaper was printed without the article in controversy (the principal
testified that he believed there was no time), see id. at 263, and that the principal's post-publica-
tion explanation was not detailed enough. See idU at 285 (Brennan, J., dissenting). His quarrel
then, was apparently not with the principal's reasons for deletion, but with his methods.
The dissent asserted, consistent with the reproduction model, that teachers were the adver-
saries of the students and if given the chance would act as "thought police," would "assume an
Orwellian guardianship of the public mind," and would "transform students into closed-circuit
recipients" of state-approved topics. Id at 285-86 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). To avoid the "brutal censorship" and "unthinking contempt" for
individual rights of the adult oppressor, high school students-despite their presumed emotional
immaturity and lack of experience with regard to the legal, moral, and ethical journalistic stan-
dards-should determine what is responsible journalism for a school-sponsored newspaper Id.
at 289-90 (Brennan, J., dissenting). According to the dissenters, the school did not need and
should not have the power to make that determination.
263 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
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1980s, a trend they attributed to increased drug use. The school officials be-
lieved and the district court found that student athletes were not only using
drugs, but were the leaders of the drug culture. After unsuccessfully trying to
address the problem with special classes, speakers, presentations, and drug-
detecting dogs, the school district held a parent "input night" to discuss the
proposed drug testing policy. The parents in attendance unanimously en-
dorsed the policy and the school board approved it.264
The Acton majority first pointed out that "special needs" existed in the
public-school context, and that the T.L.O. Court "explicitly acknowledged"
that "the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement" of indi-
vidualized suspicion of wrongdoing.265 But the Acton Court's analysis of
school power lies primarily in the section of the opinion that described the
privacy interest of public school students. 66 In that section, the Court
achieved much more than simply declaring that student athletes have limited
privacy expectations. By linking the legitimacy of those privacy expectations
to the student's legal relationship with the State, the Court could-in defin-
ing that legal relationship-set forth the nature of school power. In so doing,
the Court breathed new life into what many viewed as the all-but-dead doc-
trine of in loco parends. The Acton Court simply defined the nature of
school power as "custodial," "tutelary," or that of a "reasonable guardian. 2 67
The Court emphasized that "central" to its analysis was the fact that
those subject to drug testing are "(1) children, who (2) have been committed
to the temporary custody of the State as schoolmaster. '268 The Court's use of
the term "custody" at the beginning of its school power analysis foreshadows
the "custodial" nature of school power that the Court highlights later in the
opinion. In addition, Justice Scalia used the term "schoolmaster" to lay the
foundation for the Blackstone quote in the next paragraph-a quote that
264 See id. at 2388-89. Under the policy, students who wish to play sports "must sign a form
consenting to the testing and must obtain the written consent of their parents." Id. at 2389.
Student athletes are tested once at the beginning of their sport season. Additionally, once each
week of the season, 10% of the athletes are randomly chosen for testing. After the students
produce a urine sample, an independent laboratory whose procedures are 99.94% accurate tests
the samples for amphetamines, cocaine, and marijuana. See id at 2389. A positive test entitles
the student to a second test. If the second test is negative, the school takes no further action. If
the second test is positive, the parents are notified. Then, at a meeting with student and parents,
the principal gives the students the option of participating in a six-week assistance program (in-
cluding weekly urinalysis) or suspension from athletics for the remainder of the season and the
next season. Suspension penalties increase for second and third offenses. See id. at 2390.
265 Id. at 2391 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). For a discussion of the
special needs doctrine, see generally Kenneth Nuger, The Special Needs Rationale: Creating a
Chasm in Fourth Amendment Analysis, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 89 (1992).
266 Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2391-93.
267 Id. at 2392, 2397.
268 Id. at 2391. By inserting the numbers "(1)" and "(2)," the Court indicates that these
elements are to be analyzed separately. Thus, children who are not in the temporary custody of
"the State as Schoolmaster" have different expectations of privacy. See Stuart C. Berman, Note,
Student Fourth Amendment Rights: Defining the Scope of the T.L.O. School Search Exception, 66
N.Y.U. L. Rv. 1077, 1123 n.249 (1991) (citing statutes and cases giving Fourth Amendment
protection to minors outside the school).
1996]
HeinOnline -- 65 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.  87 1996-1997
The George Washington Law Review
describes the parental delegation of power to the schoolmaster, who then
stands in loco parenti.269
Justice Scalia quickly noted that at common law, "and still today," chil-
dren lack "some of the most fundamental fights of self-determination." 270
Even the "right to come and go at will" is subject to the "control of their
parents or guardians." 271 Here Justice Scalia has both set up the control of
parent or guardian as virtually absolute, "even as to [the child's] physical
freedom," 272 and equated the power of a guardian-which he employed later
in the opinion to describe the nature of school power273-with that of a par-
ent. After describing how children lack fights because of parental power and
control, Justice Scalia changed the scene to the school. But Justice Scalia did
not immediately reveal the nature of power in public schools. He first made
a special point to discuss the power of teachers and administrators in private
schools who, he stated, "stand in loco parentis over the children entrusted to
them. '274 In fact, he declared, the "tutor or schoolmaster is the very proto-
type" of in loco parentis status.275 The Court then quoted Blackstone's de-
scription of in loco parentis: parental delegation of authority to the child's
tutor or schoolmaster, who is then considered to be in loco parentis, assuming
the parent's power of "restraint and correction. '276
Although the Court did not explicitly state that it unequivocally en-
dorsed the in loco parentis doctrine in public schools, its description of the
schoolmaster as the prototype of in loco parentis status and its quotation of
Blackstone with approval surely conveys that the Court is comfortable with
the doctrine, at least in some contexts.2 7 Moreover, by pointing out that
private school teachers stand in loco parentis over schoolchildren, the Court
pointed the reader toward the inference that this relationship may be part of
the reason that private schools are generally considered capable of preserv-
ing the kind of environment where serious learning can take place.278 By
269 See Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2391.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 Id.
273 See id. at 2397 (describing school power as that of a "reasonable guardian").
274 Id. at 2391.
275 Id.
276 Id. (quoting 1 W usAm BL.AcKsToNE, COMMENTARES *453) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
277 See Kamisar, supra note 17, at 2246 (noting the Court's emphasis on the fact that a drug
detection policy involved minors "over whom school personnel stand in loco parentis" and ques-
tioning whether the entire student body could be tested under in loco parentis or some other
justification); Rossow & Stefkovich, supra note 70, at 49 (stating that Acton "invigorated" in loco
parentis); Drug Testing: High Court Gives Schools' Adults Freedom to Make the Rules, CINCIN-
NATI ENQUIRER, July 5, 1995, at A6 (stating that the "Court held that schools serve 'in loco
parentis' for the children entrusted to their care"); Mickenberg, supra note 17, at C8 (noting
Court's 'heavy reliance on the schools' in loco parentis responsibility"); Supreme Court, in
School Case, Upholds Random Drug Testing, DRUG DETECTION REP., July 5,1995, at 1 (explain-
ing that the Court based its opinion in part on the fact that children are "under control of school
officials as stand-ins for their parents").
278 See JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., HIGH SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT. PUBLIC, CATHOLIC, AND
PRIVATE SCHOOLS COMPARED 179-80 (1982) (finding that private schools "produce better cog-
nitive outcomes than public schools" even when "family background factors that predict
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subtly approving the principle behind in loco parentis, Justice Scalia set the
stage for the Court's depiction of the nature of school power.
The Court first alluded to the source of the school's power and then
spelled out the nature of that power. The Court seemed to be asserting for
the first time that the school possesses a sui generis power that has two
sources: the delegated power of the parent and the power of the State.279
The Court observed that T.L. 0. had "rejected the notion that public schools,
like private schools, exercise only parental power over their students."280
Justice Scalia pointed out that the Court had stated in T.L. 0. that this view
(presumably the view that public schools exercise "only" parental power) is
not consonant with compulsory education laws and is inconsistent with opin-
ions treating school officials as state actors in other contexts.28l To make the
point that school power may nevertheless be derived from the parent, Justice
Scalia depicted T.L. 0. as "denying that the State's power over schoolchildren
is formally no more than the delegated power of their parents." 2 Thus, the
power may be more than, but it still includes, the power of the parent.283
Significantly, despite the theoretical conflict between compulsory school laws
and the theory of voluntary parental delegation of power, the Acton Court
appears to have declared without explanation that parental delegation is
nonetheless a source of school power.
As surprising as this declaration may seem, if it is truly compulsory
school laws that are the primary theoretical problem with parental declara-
tion of authority, the Court is actually on firmer ground than it would initially
appear. In recent years, all fifty states have passed statutes that allow par-
ents, subject to various checks and conditions, to teach their children at
home.284 In the states with "home school" statutes, the parents may freely
choose to educate the child themselves, rather than send the child to a school.
achievement are controlled"); see also JAMES S. COLEMAN & THOMAS HOFFER, PUBLIC AND
PRrVATE HIGH ScHooLs: THE IMPACr OF COMMUNITIEs (1987) (noting "strong evidence of
greater growth in Catholic schools than in public schools, in both verbal skills and mathemat-
ics"); Kaufman, supra note 9, at Al (noting the better performance of students in private
schools).
279 See THAYER, supra note 111, at 324 (noting that the school "as the servant of more than
one master" is called upon to help students "resolve the conflicting claims of the local commu-
nity, the larger society, and the accepted principles and ideals of a still higher authority").
280 Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2391 (emphasis added).
281 See id. at 2392. Justice Scalia was not entirely correct here. In discussing the conflict
with compulsory education laws, the T.L.O. Court actually stated that "the concept of parental
delegation as a source of school authority is not entirely consonant with compulsory education
laws." New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985) (emphasis added) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Indeed, one commentator observed that after T.L.O. "courts can-
not possibly view public school officials as anything but 'state' actors when examining their con-
duct vis-a-vis students." Goodwin, supra note 234, at 691 (emphasis added). The T.L.O. Court
also stated, however, that "school officials act as representatives of the State, not merely as
surrogates for the parent." T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336. But if Justice Scalia was attempting to clear
up the ambiguity in T.L.O., he should have stated that he was doing so instead of claiming that
the T.L.O. Court had set forth a straightforward analysis.
282 Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2392 (emphasis added).
283 But see Levin, supra note 234, at 1680 (arguing that school is not extension of parent,
but of government).
284 See Kaslow, supra note 153, at 9. See generally Jon S. Lerner, Comment, Protecting
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In so doing, the parents also choose whether to keep to themselves all of the
parental power that is necessary to restrain and correct the child so that he
may obtain an education2 or, instead, to delegate the duty and the accom-
panying power to someone else.28 6
Rather than comment further on the dual source of the school's power,
the Court chose instead to denominate the nature of that power. It is the
nature of that power that affects the privacy expectations of the students with
regard to drug testing by the school. Of course, the nature of school power
will also affect the privacy expectations of the students if the school attempts
other kinds of school searches and will affect the analysis of other constitu-
tional guarantees for students as well.
The nature of the power that schools possess is "custodial" and "tute-
lary,"287 terms the Court had never used before to describe the relationship
between school and student.28 8 Later in the opinion the Court used the term
"guardian" to portray the nature of the school's power.289 Justice Scalia
never explained how he selected the terms "custodial," "tutelary," or "guard-
ian,"290 but he explained the effect of this power: the state is permitted a
greater degree of "supervision and control" than it could exercise over "free
adults"; close supervision of school children is required; schools may enforce
"'rules against conduct that would be perfectly permissible if undertaken by
an adult.' "291
But Justice Scalia had to walk a fine line here. The more control the
State exercises over school children, the more "custodial" a relationship be-
comes, the closer the State gets to a constitutional "duty to protect" under
Home Schooling Through the Casey Undue Burden Standard, 62 U. Cm. L. REv. 363, 374-75
(1995) (describing different types of home schooling regulations).
285 See 1 WIuIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *453 (stating that a parent may delegate
part of his parental authority to the schoolmaster, who then has the power of restraint and
correction "necessary to answer the purposes for which he is employed").
286 See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,242 (1963) (Brennan,
J., concurring) ("Attendance at the public schools has never been compulsory; parents remain
morally and constitutionally free to choose the academic environment in which they wish their
children to be educated ... [either] a public secular education... [or] some form of private or
sectarian education .... ).
287 See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
288 In Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984), the Court authorized pretrial detention of
juveniles and stated that "juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of custody." Id. at
265 (citations omitted). According to Acton, during school hours this custody is committed to
teachers and school officials. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2392 (1995).
But cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977) (observing that students are "not physically
restrained from leaving school").
289 Justice Scalia used the term "guardian" twice. See Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2396 ("The most
significant element in the case is... that the Policy was undertaken in furtherance of the govern-
ment's responsibilities, under a public school system, as guardian and tutor of children entrusted
to its care.") (footnote omitted); id. at 2397 ("[W]hen the government acts as guardian and tutor
the relevant question is whether the search is one that a reasonable guardian and tutor might
undertake.").
290 The Court merely quoted T.L.O.'s statement that a proper educational environment
requires close supervision and rules against conduct that would be permissible if undertaken by
an adult. See id at 2392.
291 Id. (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985)).
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DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services. 292 Justice
Scalia did not wish to signal to the lower courts that they had been wrong in
their virtually unanimous post-Deshaney rulings that public school students
do not have an affirmative constitutional right to governmental protection
while at school.293 So in the midst of all this discussion of power, custody,
and control, Justice Scalia must explain that this control by public schools-
although substantial-is, "of course," not "as a general matter ... such a
degree of control over children as to give rise to a constitutional 'duty to
protect.' "294
In the same sentence where Justice Scalia claimed that public schools do
not have "such a degree" of control, he described that control with a phrase
that affords the school almost unconstrained power, the power the school
obtains by acting in loco parentis:
While we do not, of course, suggest that public schools as a general
matter have such a degree of control over children to give rise to a
constitutional duty to protect, we have acknowledged that for many
purposes school authorities act in loco parentis, with the power and
indeed the duty to inculcate the habits and manners of civility.295
Recall that Justice Scalia has previously described parental authority as con-
trol over "the most fundamental rights of self-determination. '296 At last, Jus-
tice Scalia finally set forth the obligatory cite to Tinker-"while children
assuredly do not 'shed their constitutional rights ...at the schoolhouse
gate' "-but he severely limited those rights and sub silentio repudiated
much of the Tinker subtext about reconstruction in the next clause-"the
nature of those rights is what is appropriate for children in school.' '297 Given
292 489 U.S. 189 (1989). Joshua DeShaney, a four year old child, sued social workers who
failed to do anything about repeated beatings by his father. The beatings left Joshua with perma-
nent brain damage and profoundly retarded. See id. at 193. The Court refused to find that the
State had an affirmative duty enforceable under the Due Process Clause to protect Joshua. See
id. at 198. Nonetheless, the Court stated that "when the State takes a person into its custody and
holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to as-
sume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being." Id. at 199-200 (citation
omitted).
293 See, ag., J.O. v. Alton Community Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267,272 (7th Cir. 1990)
(finding no duty to protect school children from a sexually abusive teacher).
294 Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2392 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989)). For an argument that the affirmative duty analysis should be based on
a certain level of state involvement (some state contribution giving rise to the claim) and on the
defendant's state of mind (whether the defendant's knowledge of the circumstances amount to
deliberate indifference to the victim's need for help), see Thomas A. Eaton & Michael Wells,
Government Inaction as a Constitutional TorL DeShaney and its Aftermath, 66 WASH. L. REv.
107, 111 (1991).
295 Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2392 (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted)
(emphasis added); see Rossow & Stefkovich, supra note 70, at 49 (maintaining that in loco paren-
tis is "invigorated" in Acton); Peters, Note, supra note 17, at 869 (stating that "the Court stated
that teachers and administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to the children"). But see
Levin, supra note 234, at 1680 (stating that in loco parentis is no longer relevant).
296 Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2391.
297 Id. at 2392 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
506 (1969)).
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the nature of school power that Acton set forth, the rights that are "appropri-
ate" for children in school will be circumscribed. 298
The Court stressed that the most significant element in the case was that
the drug testing was undertaken in furtherance of government responsibili-
ties as "guardian" and "tutor." The Court then added a new test: "[W]hen
the government acts as guardian and tutor the relevant question is whether
the search is one that a reasonable guardian and tutor might undertake. 299
It is interesting to note that Justice Scalia did not describe the government's
responsibilities here as that of "custodian" and "tutor," even though he had
earlier in the opinion twice described the nature of school power as' "custo-
dial" and "tutelary." In this test, however, the Court dropped "custodial"
and added "guardian," and in the next paragraph he even referred to the
students' parents as their "primary guardians," 300 implying that the school or
school official is some kind of secondary guardian. The dissent did not take
issue with the majority's characterization; indeed, the dissent agreed that
"schools have traditionally had special guardian-like responsibilities for chil-
dren that necessitate a degree of constitutional leeway. '30 1
The contours of school power-as defined by the Acton Court-are thus
broad and deep. Blackstone, whom Justice Scalia used to describe the power
of the schoolmaster, describes the "guardian" as a "temporary parent. ' 3°2
Generally, a guardian of a minor child has "the powers and responsibilities of
a parent regarding the ward's support, care, and education. '303 Similarly, a
custodian generally means a person who has "care and control of a thing or
person, '304 and custody of a minor child "embraces the sum of parental rights
... includ[ing] the right to the child's services and earnings, and the right to
direct his activities and make decisions regarding his care and control, educa-
tion, health, and religion. '305 It is not clear what the Court meant by "tute-
298 According to the Court, student athletes have even less of a legitimate expectation of
privacy. See id. at 2392.
299 Id. at 2397.
300 Id.
301 Id. at 2404 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
302 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *460.
303 Uniform Guardianship & Protective Proceedings Act § 2-109, quoted in 39 AM. JUR. 2D
Guardian and Ward § 17.5 (Supp. 1996); see also 39 C.J.S. Guardian and Ward § 3 (1976) (stating
that a general guardian of the person of a minor virtually occupies the position of a parent, but
the legal relationship is not identical with that of a parent) (footnotes omitted); id. at § 55 ("A
guardian of the person of a minor stands in loco parentis, being vested with general power of
control, and should supply the watchfulness, care, and discipline essential to the young ....")
(footnotes omitted); 39 AM. JUR. 2D Guardian and Ward § 65 (1968) (guardian stands in loco
parentis to ward) (footnote omitted). Although different types of guardians have legal recogni-
tion-statutory or testamentary guardians, public guardians, and general guardians, the Court
did not specify any particular class guardianship; thus I state the powers thereof only in general
terms.
304 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 384 (6th ed. 1990).
305 59 AM. JuR- 2D Parent and Child § 23 (1987) (footnote omitted); see, e.g., GA. CODE
ANN. § 15-11-2(5) (1994) ("'Custodian' means a person, other than a parent or legal guardian,
who stands in loco parentis to the child .... ); N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 3212(1) (McKinney 1995)
(stating that a custodian stands in "parental relation").
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lary" power, but the Court appears to contemplate a power greater than the
state generally has over adults. 30 6
Acton thus breaks the Tinker mold, even going beyond earlier attempts
to modify Tinker. Now that the Court has stated what the nature of school
power is, cases in the future will have to deal with Acton's explicit declaration
of strong school power rather than Tinker's implicit endorsement of the con-
strained power of the reconstruction model.3 7 In the next section I explain
why repudiating Tinker and reconstruction is good for public schools, and I
suggest the direction that future refinements to Acton may take.
III. The Nature of School Power: The Future
A. The Strength of Acton
For those who are serious about the kind of public school reform that
would revive confidence in the public school as an institution, Acton-
though flawed-is a giant step in the right direction. It has addressed two
problems with the Court's opinions on school power that have vexed those
who would have our nation's public schools become institutions where stu-
dents can and do receive a serious education. The first problem is the lack of
predictability in the Court's opinions as it moved up and down the school
306 See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2333 (West 1995) ("Unless fully emancipated, a minor may
not enter into a matrimonial agreement without the written concurrence of his father and
mother, or of the parent having his legal custody, or of the tutor of his person."); LA. CODE CIV.
PRoc. ANN. art. 4261 (West 1961) ("The tutor shall have custody of and shall care for the person
of the minor [and] shall see that the minor is properly reared and educated in accordance with
his station in life."). In Louisiana a "tutor's" duties can also be similar to those of a trustee. See
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 4262 (West Supp 1996) ("The tutor shall take possession of,
preserve, and administer the minor's property .... He shall act at all times as a prudent admin-
istrator, and shall be personally responsible for all damages resulting from his failure so to act.");
see also Rossow & Stefkovich, supra note 70, at 49 (describing tutelary power as somewhat less
than in loco parentis but allowing "far more control" than government generally has against
adults).
307 Instead of being shaded by Tinker, one lower court has used Acton as support for hold-
ing that a search of a student by a public school "liaison police officer" was permissible. See
People v. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d 310, 317, 318, 321 (Ill.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1692 (1996).
Another court has used Acton to uphold a generalized search of all male students if a metal
detector has sounded; the students are asked to remove jackets, shoes, and socks, as well as
empty their pockets and submit to a pat down. See Thompson v. Carthage Sch. Dist., 87 F.3d
979, 982 (8th Cir. 1996); see also Wojcik v. Town of N. Smithfield, 76 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996)
(using Acton to support a determination that school officials did not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment's prohibition against unreasonable seizure by transporting a student thought to be abused
to another school to be interviewed with a sibling); Wallace v. Batavia Sch. Dist. 101, 68 F.3d
1010, 1013 (7th Cir. 1995) (implying that Acton limited rights of students: "We know that stu-
dents do not completely surrender their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate [citing
Tinker], but 'the nature of those rights is what is appropriate for children in school' [quoting
Acton]"); Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883,892 (9th Cir. 1995) (Wiggins, J., dissenting) (stating
that Acton "reaffirmed that in the interest of safe school environments, students enjoy fewer
rights than adults, or even than children outside of classrooms"); Moule Through Moule v. Para-
dise Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 69, No. 94-17021,1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 25187, at *1 (9th Cir.
July 10, 1995) (upholding school drug testing policy based on Acton). Commentators have ob-
served that Acton may have provided the rationale for "re-empowering" school authorities.
Rossow & Stefkovich, supra note 70, at 49. Nonetheless, there remains the possibility, of course,
that some future majority will confine Acton to its specific facts.
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power continuum, ducking and weaving its way both toward and away from
Tinker. The second problem is the reconstruction model and Tinker itself.
There are always difficulties when the Court decides cases without a
guiding principle, and the most obvious problem is the lack of predictability.
Deep philosophical divisions in the Court give little guidance to teachers and
school officials who must order their day-to-day behavior based on the
Court's pronouncements. With no discernible theory of the nature of school
power, teachers and school principals in public schools have been at a loss as
to what they are allowed to do to maintain order.308 Although it was some-
times possible to glean from an opinion what the vague contours of the
power allowed in that particular case may have been, it was difficult to per-
ceive any definition of the contours of school power from case-to-case over
time or to take any guiding principle from the opinions that could instruct
schools and courts in future cases. Put simply, the opinions before Acton
may have implicitly addressed why a certain amount of power was needed,
but they never made an effort to delineate the nature or scope of that power.
In addition, the Court never grappled with the serious public concerns
that its opinions spawned. The cost in resources to the school to comply with
an opinion like Goss is not merely the cost of providing "some kind" of no-
tice and hearing. The Court's decision in Wood v. Strickland3°9 the same year
it decided Goss opened the door to damage actions against school board
members and school officials who deny students their "basic, unquestioned
constitutional rights. '310 The prospect of a lawsuit, with its resulting public-
ity, expense, and unpleasantness is hardly one that will be relished by either
teacher or school administrator, even if the school and teacher are ultimately
vindicated. 311 Indeed, a threat by a student or parent, even if it is based on a
308 The lower courts have also sent confusing signals. For example, in the Acton litigation
the district court upheld the school's drug testing policy, Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 796 F.
Supp. 1354, 1365 (D. Ore. 1992), the Ninth Circuit reversed, 23 F.3d 1514, 1527 (9th Cir. 1994),
and then the Supreme Court vacated and remanded, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2397 (1995). The federal
courts outside the Ninth Circuit were also split on the school drug testing issue. Compare Schaill
by Kross v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1324 (7th Cir. 1988) (allowing drug
testing), with Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759, 766 (S.D.
Tex. 1989) (holding that a drug testing program was unconstitutional), aff'd, 930 F.2d 915 (5th
Cir. 1991). Similar confusion has reigned in other cases. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 264-66 (1988) (reversing the Eighth Circuit, which had reversed the
District Court, which had held that the principal's action did not violate students' First Amend-
ment rights).
309 420 U.S. 308 (1975), limited on other grounds, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 &
n.25 (1982).
310 Id. at 322. The students claimed their due process rights were violated when they were
suspended for violating a school regulation prohibiting the use or possession of intoxicating bev-
erages at school or at school activities. The Court held that although public school officials have
a qualified good faith immunity from liability for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a school
official is not immune "if he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took
within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the student
affected." Id.
311 "[T]eachers and counselors have become consistently unwilling to exert authority, in
part because they fear litigation, but also because they 'are no longer sure that they know what is
right, or if they do, that they have any right to impose it.'" Hafen, supra note 4, at 686 (quoting
Grant, supra note 4, at 41).
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groundless claim and falls short of a formal lawsuit, is an extremely disagree-
able experience that most teachers and school administrators will attempt to
avoid if at all possible. As Judge Learned Hand once declared, "I must say
that, as a litigant, I should dread a lawsuit beyond almost anything else short
of sickness and of death. 312
The murky constitutional standards set by the Court-"substantial dis-
ruption," "continuing danger," "reasonable suspicion,"-hardly give teach-
ers, who are untrained in the law but fearful of a lawsuit, much comfort. The
number of cases that followed in the wake of T.L.O. challenging whether a
school official's suspicion was reasonable demonstrates the vague shape of
the reasonable suspicion standard 3 A teacher who hopes to avoid trouble
will not always respond right away to problems in the classroom. Rather
than dealing with a problem immediately, careful teachers will either spend
time trying to ascertain whether a court would find their suspicion reasonable
or, more likely, will avoid the problem altogether to avoid any controversy.314
312 JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON ThiAL: MYTH AND REALrrY iN AmERCAN JUSTICE 40
(1950).
313 "[T]he amorphous 'reasonableness under all the circumstances' standard freshly coined
by the Court today will likely spawn increased litigation and greater uncertainty among teachers
and administrators." New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,365 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part). Students also sue school officials regarding the reasonableness of school
"seizures." See, eg., Wallace v. Batavia Sch. Dist. 101, 68 F.3d 1010, 1011 (7th Cir. 1995) (ad-
dressing a claim in which a teacher and a school district were sued when a teacher momentarily
grasped a student's wrist and elbow to escort the fighting and cursing student out of the class-
room); Hassan v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 55 F.3d 1075, 1078 (5th Cir.) (considering a suit in
which a school district, a principal, and a teacher were sued for disciplining a disruptive student
on a field trip to a detention center when they placed the student in a holding room so that other
students could continue the tour without distraction), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 532 (1995).
The Acton Court recognized that testing based only on the reasonable suspicion standard of
T.L.O. would generate lawsuits charging that the testing was imposed without reason or claiming
that greater process was necessary before the testing could occur. See Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2396.
314 Students have used cases like Tinker and Goss to challenge a wide variety of decisions
by teachers and principals. For examples of the kinds of lawsuits that schools and teachers have
been forced to defend in federal court, see Wiemerslage Through Wiemerslage v. Maine Town-
ship High Sch. Dist. 207,29 F.3d 1149, 1150-51 (7th Cir. 1994) (claiming that restricting access to
an area adjacent to school gate violated the First Amendment right to assembly); Poling v. Mur-
phy, 872 F.2d 757, 758,760-61 (6th Cir. 1989) (challenging a decision to disqualify a student from
running for student council president when the student gave a campaign speech to the student
body that was "admittedly 'discourteous' and 'rude'" toward the assistant principal); Mitchell v.
Board of Trustees, 625 F.2d 660,661 (5th Cir. 1980) (challenging mandatory expulsion for violat-
ing a rule prohibiting weapons on campus); Hill by and through Hill v. Rankin County, Missis-
sippi Sch. Dist., 843 F. Supp. 1112, 1114-15 (S.D. Miss. 1993) (claiming a due process violation
when a student with a history of disciplinary problems was expelled after striking another stu-
dent without provocation, knocking him down, and assaulting and cursing a school secretary);
Broussard by Lord v. School Bd., 801 F. Supp. 1526, 1527, 1530 (E.D. Va. 1992) (claiming a one-
day suspension for wearing a "Drugs Suck!" t-shirt violated the First Amendment and Due Pro-
cess Clause); Draper v. Columbus Pub. Schs., 760 F. Supp. 131, 131,134 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (alleg-
ing a procedural due process violation despite an informal hearing with a principal, written
notice of a formal hearing and right to appeal sent to parents, and representation by an attorney
at an appellate hearing); Dickens by Dickens v. Johnson County Bd. of Educ., 661 F. Supp. 155,
156-57 (E.D. Tenn. 1987) (claiming temporary placement in a "timeout" area that was segre-
gated from other students violated due process); Haverkamp v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 380, 689
F. Supp. 1055, 1056 (D. Kan. 1986) (claiming a due process violation for removal from a varsity
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Faced with the Court's mixed feelings regarding reconstruction and re-
production, its uncertain standards, its implied encouragement to challenge
school decisions and the possibility of a damage action, the logical reaction
by teachers and principals is to overcompensate, with the result that even the
"modicum of discipline and order" that the Goss Court allowed was essential
cannot be consistently maintained.315 Indeed the discretion that due process
restrains may well be a "prerequisite to the maintenance of institutional ex-
cellence. '316 As then-Professor Wilkinson 317 predicted, "[t]he further entry
into school discipline of so formidable a force as the courts and the judicial
process may simply discourage some school officials from taking firm discipli-
nary action. '318 To the extent that Acton encourages public school officials to
reclaim order and discipline in the classroom, it will also enrich the opportu-
nity of the public school student to obtain a serious education.
But what of the definition of school power that the Court has adopted?
Although, as explained below, the Court's analysis needs refinement, its re-
nunciation of Tinker and the reconstruction model is a welcome and hearten-
ing revelation for those who would revitalize the public school. Asking the
school to be a major force in reconstructing society's ills is thrusting an enor-
mous weight upon an institution that has burdens enough in performing the
education process expected of it. Moreover, the Justices who used this model
based their opinions on their own misconceptions about day-to-day life in the
classroom and the way serious learning takes place.
Justice Fortas was simply wrong when he said "[t]he principal use to
which the schools are dedicated is to accommodate students during pre-
scribed hours for the purpose of certain types of activities. 3 19 If all schools
cheering squad); Student Doe v. Pennsylvania, 593 F. Supp. 54, 56 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (challenging
exclusion from a gifted class); Karnstein v. Pewaukee Sch. Bd., 557 F. Supp. 565, 566-67 (E.D.
Wis. 1983) (challenging denial of admission to the National Honor Society on due process
grounds); Bernstein v. Menard, 557 F. Supp. 90,91 (E.D. Va. 1982) (challenging dismissal from a
high school band), appeal dismissed, 728 F.2d 252 (4th Cir. 1984).
315 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975); see Kirp, supra note 12, at 863-64 (noting that
defensive behavior by school officials is a likely reaction to Goss); id. at 874 (pointing out that a
teacher will be reluctant to undertake "a course of action that best serves child if they are
obliged openly to defend it"); see also Ronald A. Cass, Damage Suits Against Public Officers,
129 U. PA. L. REv. 1110, 1133-74 (1981) (discussing the costs and effects of official liability);
Eaton & Wells, supra note 294, at 131 (noting the problem of overdeterrence: "Faced with the
prospect of tort liability for their errors, officials may become too cautious."). Cases allowing
suits against schools under Title IX for student-on-student sexual harassment, see, e.g., Davis v.
Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 1996), may have led to the suspension of a
young boy who was accused of kissing girls. See No Bliss from Boy's Kiss, WASH. POST., Sept.
25, 1996, at A2.
316 Kirp, supra note 12, at 874.
317 Judge Wilkinson now sits on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
318 Wilkinson, supra note 196, at 68; see also Kevin Brown, Termination of Public School
Desegregation: Determination of Unitary Status Based on the Elimination of Invidious Value In-
culcation, 58 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1105, 1138 (1990) (noting the Goss Court's "sizeable intrusion
into what had previously been the exclusive province of educators").
319 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969). Note the comparison
between Justice Fortas's assertion and the emphasis the social reconstructionists placed on focus-
ing attention upon the child and the importance of her interests. See supra notes 111-123 and
accompanying text; see also THAYER, supra note 111, at 313; id. at 336-37 (quoting ROBERT
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do is what the reconstructionists demand-accommodate students-the stu-
dents will be unable to obtain the education necessary to put into effect the
values inherent in the Constitution. Teachers must necessarily have the abil-
ity and the confidence to be judgmental-to demand that students adhere to
higher standards of behavior. As Robert Maynard Hutchins observed, the
"'ideal education' "-or what I call a "serious education"-is "'not an ad
hoc education .... It is an education calculated to develop the mind.' "320
On the surface, preserving the educational environment necessary for chil-
dren to develop the mind requires a degree of authority that at first appears
antithetical to First Amendment values.321 As Professor Hamilton has writ-
ten, the function of the First Amendment is to challenge tyranny,322 and we
should find ways to teach children habits of mind that preclude totalitarian-
ism. For children, though, the means is not to challenge school authority.
Children are "not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which
is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees. 323 "[I]f free speech is
to be meaningful, a citizen must have something worth saying, together with
the maturity and the skill needed to say it."324 Only an educated citizen will
have the tools to challenge both government tyranny and that of
demagogues.32
MAYNARD HuTrcmNs, A CONVERSATION ON EDUCATION 11 (1963) (criticizing the American
educational system for becoming "a program of accommodating the young until we are ready to
have them go to work")) (internal quotation marks omitted).
320 THAYER, supra note 111, at 338 (quoting HtrrcmNs, supra note 319, at 1) (internal
quotation marks omitted). For an account of Hutchins's disagreements with Dewey, see RYAN,
supra note 116, at 276-281. For different views about the ability of students to obtain a serious
education in America's public schools, compare CHARLES J. SYKES, DUMBINO DOWN OUR KIDS:
WHY AMEICA's CHILDREN FEEL GOOD ABOUT THEMSELVES BUT CAN'T READ, WrE, OR
ADD 10 (1995) (contending that too much emphasis on self-esteem leaves little room for acquir-
ing knowledge), with DAVID C. BERLINER & BRUCE J. BIDDLE, THE MANUFACTURED CRSIS:
MYTHS, FRAUD, AND THE ATrACK ON AMERICA'S PuBLIC ScHooLs 3, 4 (1995) (arguing that
critics of public education are engaged in a deliberate disinformation campaign).
321 See THAYER, supra note 111, at 315-16 ("[G]rowing up involves of necessity a high
degree of imposition and indoctrination of the young."); Levin, supra note 234, at 1649 (noting
the conflict between creating an ordered environment and the rights of individual students).
322 See Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. REV. 73,84-85 (1996) (illustrating how
the First Amendment "enshrines the most effective means of challenging the ever-entrenching
institutionalization of a government that is inherently separate from the people themselves")
(footnote omitted); Marci A. Hamilton, The First Amendment's Challenge Function and the Con-
fusion in the Supreme Court's Contemporary Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 29 GA. L. REv. 81, 84-
94 (1994) (examining the First Amendment's historical development as a tool to challenge
tyranny).
323 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 515 (Stewart, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
324 Hafen, supra note 4, at 666; see also id. at 712 (noting the First Amendment interests of
both students and society in sustaining the institutional authority of the school in fulfilling the
broad educational goals of the public school system).
325 See Mark V. Tushnet, Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory, 83 MICH. L.
REv. 1502, 1542-43 (1985) (describing the social base for the Framers' republicanism and stating
that citizens must have "sufficient education in public matters and in their republican traditions
to understand the virtues of the republican polity, in order that they be able to resist its subver-
sion from within and without").
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To help children obtain the necessary capacity for individual choice, the
school curriculum must be strong and diverse. Students must first receive a
"serious education 326 so that when they reach maturity they may participate
knowledgeably in democratic institutions. 327 Obtaining a "serious educa-
tion"-perhaps the ultimate liberation-is not easy, and it is seldom, if ever,
divorced from discipline. It most often involves hard work, concentration
and constraints-discipline of self and discipline of others so that an environ-
ment can exist where serious learning can and will take place.3 28
Requiring substantial interference or material disruption to the educa-
tion process to occur before a teacher can discipline a student for expression
simply does not allow schools to create an environment where serious learn-
ing will consistently occur. Even a "slight" disruption can derail a class for a
significant period of time. Thus, the Tinker Court's substantial interference
standard was based on a fundamentally flawed perception of the reality of
the classroom. Although the Court seemed to concede that the school has
certain pedagogical concerns, it erred when it second-guessed the school offi-
cials' judgment about the effect of the Vietnam protest on school students
and the education process. This concern on the part of school officials was
patently reasonable. As the district court found, when the armband regula-
tion was promulgated, debate over the Vietnam war "had become vehement
in many localities. '329 A protest march had recently been held in Washing-
ton, D.C., and incidents of draft card burning had swept the country.330
"Both individuals supporting the war and those opposing it were quite vocal
in expressing their views," even at the school board hearing on the armband
regulation.331 In fact, a mere two months before the armband protest, peace
marchers in Oakland were attacked by members of a motorcycle gang, who
termed the protesters "un-American. '332 It is no wonder that school officials
and teachers believed that a protest would disturb the "disciplined atmos-
326 Hafen, supra note 4, at 693 (stating that "the most fundamental interest young people
have in the values of the first amendment" is "the right to receive a serious education").
327 See MORGAN, supra note 140, at 97-98 ("The qualification of voters is as important as
the qualifications of governors, and even comes first, in the natural order .... As the children
now are, so will the sovereigns soon be.") (quoting Horace Mann's Lecture on Education, supra
note 140); Suzanna Sherry, "Without Virtue There Can Be No Liberty", 78 MINN. L. REv. 61,77-
78 (1993) (arguing for education that makes one capable of participation as "a virtuous republi-
can citizen"); cf. PAUL M. SNIDERMAN & THOMAS PIAZZA, Tim SCAR OF RACE 13 (1993) (sug-
gesting that those with the least amount of formal education are more likely to make racial
judgments).
328 See Hafen, supra note 4, at 665 (cautioning that "[e]xcessive student autonomy can im-
pair the most fundamental learning processes"); see also THAYER, supra note 111, at 361 (noting
that Walter Lippmann "attributed the failures of the western democracies in large measure to
the fact that educators have substituted the 'cult of the child' "for an "emphasis upon informing
and disciplining man's rational nature"); cf RYAN, supra note 116, at 348 (describing the two
views of education as "those who thought the aim of education was to get the child to master an
intellectual discipline" and "those who thought of the 'needs' of the child").
329 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971, 972-73 (S.D. Iowa
1966), aff'd, 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
330 See id. at 973.
331 Id.
332 See Tim PoEL's CHRONOLOGY 1107 (James Trager ed., 1979).
[Vol 65:49
HeinOnline -- 65 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.  98 1996-1997
Keeping Order in Public Schools
phere [of] the classroom. '333 Indeed, if a student had been harmed in any
way because of the protest, school officials may have been liable under state
tort laws for negligent supervision in failing to protect children from a fore-
seeable harm.334
Any teacher knows that disruption of the educational process takes
many shapes.335 The Tinker Court apparently believed that only a palpable
disruption-a physical disturbance or disorder-could affect the school's
function.3 36 But children are easily diverted from their studies and indeed
often welcome the smallest distraction as an excuse to attend to something
other than the task at hand. Moreover, as any teacher knows and studies of
the learning process show,337 the kind of distraction that is sufficient to inter-
fere with the learning process will vary from school to school, from class to
class and sometimes even from day to day3 38 Plainly the petitioners in
Tinker wore the armbands to attract some kind of attention. The armbands
did exactly what the school principals had feared: they allowed students to
defy teachers' orders and diverted the students' minds from their studies to
the "highly emotional subject of the Vietnam War. '339 The teacher, certainly
better than the judiciary, can best ascertain how a war protest at school
would affect "the mental or emotional state that is necessary, appropriate, or
desirable for learning to take place."340
By inserting the reconstruction model into the Supreme Court's opin-
ions, Tinker did more than merely allow a protest over Vietnam. It paved the
way for the decline in school order and educational quality. It even helped to
change student perceptions. The underlying message-a message that has
333 Tinker, 258 F. Supp. at 972.
334 For the standard of care for teachers, see, for example, Baird v. Hosmer, 347 N.E.2d
533, 537 (Ohio 1976) (reasonable care), Eastman v. Williams, 207 A.2d 146, 148 (Vt. 1965) (due
care), and Payne v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 382 S.E.2d 449, 451 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1989) (asking what degree of care "a person of ordinary prudence, charged with teacher's
duties, would exercise in the same circumstances"). See also Chris Hutton, School as Good
Parent: Symbolism Versus Substance in Drug and Alcohol Testing of School Children, 21 J. L. &
EDUC. 33, 59 (1992) (noting a case in which a school adopted a drug testing program in response
to accusations by students and their parents that the school board was failing to respond to the
school's drug problem effectively).
335 See David A. Diamond, The First Amendment and Public Schools: The Case Against
Judicial Intervention, 59 TEX. L. REv. 447, 485 (1981) (stating that there are different forms of
educational disruption).
336 See id. (suggesting that disruption can be nonphysical). Moreover, Justice Fortas was
not clear whether the standard is met if conduct or speech merely causes others to be disruptive
or if the conduct or speech must also be disruptive in and of itself.
337 See generally Diane Felmlee et al., Peer Influence on Classroom Attention, 48 So.
PsYcHoL Q. 215, 223 (1985) ("Our quantitative analysis suggests that a distracting comment or
action does indeed have a statistically significant effect on the probability an individual becomes
inattentive at a later point in the lesson, even when controlling for a number of individual and
group characteristics.").
338 As Professor Hafen observed, "At one time a student may need the temporary repres-
sion of discipline in order to develop the skills necessary for genuine freedom. At other times,
that same student may need to be left completely free (perhaps even pushed to break free) to try
his or her creative wings." Hafen, supra note 4, at 667-68.
339 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,518 (1969) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
340 Diamond, supra note 335, at 486 (footnote omitted).
1996]
HeinOnline -- 65 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.  99 1996-1997
The George Washington Law Review
infected to some degree nearly every opinion since Tinker was written-is
that, according to the highest court in the land, teachers should be treated
like adversaries that should be confronted and challenged, because they are
untrustworthy in dealing with students. In undermining the trust between
teacher and student, the Court tore at the very fiber of the education enter-
prise. Even if not singularly responsible for school decline, the Court's opin-
ions have sent public messages that undermine the school's efforts to provide
students with a serious education. There is no "pedagogical device" to guar-
antee that a student will achieve.341 The success of the education enterprise
"depends upon the formation of relationships between students and teachers
premised on trust. '342 The trust between student and teacher is "vital, be-
cause it evokes student 'motivation to learn ... independently of teacher
demands for compliance.' 343 But trust is a "personal bond" that is easily
damaged and "may well be impossible to attain if students begin to perceive
pedagogical objectives as alien to their own needs."'344
The Acton Court, like Justice Powell and the reproductionists, recog-
nized the importance of trust between teacher and student. The Court sim-
ply refused to allow its opinion to turn the teacher into the adversary of the
student. The Acton Court turned a deaf ear to the argument that only the
least intrusive search practicable-drug testing only on suspicion of drug
use-can be "reasonable" for Fourth Amendment concerns.345 There are in-
deed difficulties with the individual suspicion alternative. Testing only on in-
dividual suspicion would transform the procedure into an accusatory process,
with all the shame that goes with it, together with lawsuits claiming incorrect
accusations or too little process. There is a risk that some teachers would
arbitrarily test troublesome students. But the greatest danger of testing only
on individualized suspicion is to the teacher-student relationship. Teachers
are in school to educate. To ask individual teachers to play a major role in
solving drug abuse by pointing out students they suspect of drug use to be
urine-tested turns teachers into the adversaries and accusers, a role few will
relish.346 The risk of a wrong accusation or of ruining a relationship of trust
with a student, even one suspected of drug use, will chill teacher accusations
and may actually hinder the battle against drug abuse. Moreover, especially
341 See Kirp, supra note 12, at 855.
342 Id. (emphasis and footnote omitted).
343 Id. (quoting Charles E. Bidwell, Students and Schools: Some Observations on Client
Trust in Client-Serving Organizations, in ORGANIZATIONS AND CLINrs 37, 50 (William R.
Rosengren & Mark Lefton eds., 1970)).
344 Id.
345 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2393-94 (1995).
346 See Mary Beth Alexander, Prop. 187 Opposed by Schools, Enrollment Decline, Higher
Costs Feared, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 16, 1994, at AV1 (quoting a school superintendent who
feared that school employees would become "police agents" if forced to turn in potential illegal
alien children as required by then-pending California Proposition 187). Moreover, an expert on
drug abuse in the Acton case stated that, without drug testing, even specially trained teachers
would still miss more than 90% of impairment caused by drugs and alcohol. Testimony of R.L.
DuPont, M.D., Deposition Testimony at 32, Acton v. Vernonia School Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp.
1354 (D. Ore. 1992) (No 91-1154MA) (April 24, 1992), quoted in Brief Amicus Curiae of Na-
tional Sch. Bds. Ass'n, at 17-18, Vernonia Sch. Dist 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995) (No. 94-
590) (available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File).
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as other institutions are crumbling, students need to have adult figures in
their lives besides their parents with whom they have an ongoing relationship
that is not so colored with fear or distrust.3 47
Many students, as Justice Black predicted, are now "willing to defy their
teachers on practically all orders"; public schools are now subject to "the
whims and caprices of their loudest-mouthed ... students. ' '348 But the repro-
duction model is not the only alternative to chaos in the schools. Although
abandoning the reconstruction model is a part of the solution, the wholesale
adoption of the reproduction model is not the only course, and it may not be
the best course available to the Court. Although Justice Black accurately
predicted the discipline problems that now occur in many public schools, it is
Justice Harlan's brief dissent in Tinker349 that comes close to setting forth a
workable principle for dealing with school power, a principle that has re-
mained buried in the Tinker dissent for almost thirty years, but that should
now be used to refine the new precepts that were set forth in Acton.
B. Refining the School Power Analysis
The problem with the power analysis in Acton is not that it took a sharp
turn away from Tinker and reconstruction. Rather, the Acton Court's analy-
sis of the nature of school power-that of custodian or guardian-was not
sufficiently nuanced. By bluntly stating that public school power over the
student is tutelary, custodial and guardian-like, the Court gave short shrift to
a complex relationship.
Despite the Court's use of the term "guardian" to describe school
power, the Court could not really have meant that a school official has all the
power of a parent or guardian, for a parent or guardian could, for example,
presumably strip search a child to search for drugs without reasonable suspi-
cion or make the child take a urine test nightly.350 Surely school officials do
not have that power. But the Court's use of the term "reasonable"-
"whether the search is one that a reasonable guardian and tutor might under-
take"-indicates that the Court attempted to set some kind of limit, at least
tacitly acknowledging that this guardian does not have quite the same power
as a parent. Nonetheless, if parents or guardians need not always act reason-
ably, and school officials must do so, then the Court has used the wrong con-
struct to define the nature of school power.
The Court was nonetheless on the right track, even with this defect. Ac-
ton is a starting point for refining the analysis of school power. The "reason-
347 See Kirp, supra note 12, at 855 (noting the importance of "the formation of relationships
between students and teachers premised on trust" to the success of the educational enterprise);
ef. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 323 (1971) ("The [welfare] caseworker is not a sleuth but
rather, we trust, is a friend to one in need.").
348 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 525 (1969) (Black, J.,
dissenting); see also MORGAN, supra note 140, at 49 ("The mobs, the riots, the burnings, the
lynchings, perpetrated by the men of the present day, are perpetrated, because of their vicious or
defective education, when children.") (quoting Horace Mann's Lecture on Education, supra
note 140).
349 See 7inker, 393 U.S. at 526 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
350 Assuming no physical or sexual abuse.
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able guardian" construct resonates with Justice Harlan's proposal in his
dissent in Tinker that the Court look at the "good faith" of school officials'
actions. Justice Harlan would have accorded school officials "the widest au-
thority in maintaining discipline and good order in their institutions."3' 51 To
that end, he would require the student to show that the school's restraint was
"motivated by other than legitimate school concerns. '352 The significant fea-
ture of Justice Harlan's proposal is that it essentially envisioned a "best inter-
est" analysis; he assumed that the teacher-who is trained and experienced
in the pedagogical needs of students-would act in the best or "legitimate"
interests of the students unless the student could show otherwise.3 53
Within Justice Harlan's dissent lies the outline for another definition of
the nature of school power. Instead of the guardian-ward construct set forth
by the Court, an attorneyship model may better describe the power relation-
ship between student, parent, and school. Professor Hamilton has posited
that the attorneyship model of representation, rather than self rule, describes
the role of the representative in a liberal republican democracy.354 Building
on the works of Constitutional Framer James Wilson and contemporary
ethicist David Luban, Professor Hamilton proposed "a theory of representa-
tion patterned after an attorneyship model that envisions the legislator acting
as an attorney to her constituents. '355 Although Professor Hamilton con-
tends that the rights and obligations of legislators and their constituents are
like that of attorney and client, the model may also have relevance in the
school context. As Professor Hamilton explains, "A representative under the
attorneyship model is entrusted with delegated responsibility to act in the
best interest of her present and future client-constituents while fulfilling an
obligation of continual communication." 356 Like a class action attorney, the
legislator is delegated the power to make independent judgments by weigh-
ing the desires and needs of both present and future clients. 357 The basis for
the delegation is the impossibility of running the government "by plebi-
scite. ' 35 8 The representative and the client-constituents are bound together
in an "overarching mutual political commitment" to each other.3 59 Indeed,
the representative acts as the "trustee" for the larger enterprise and, because
of that responsibility, may be forced to ignore the voices of some individu-
351 7Inker, 393 U.S. at 526 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
352 Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
353 The Hazelwood Court hinted at Justice Harlan's theory when it stated that the school
principal had power to control student speech if the restraint was "reasonably related to legiti-
mate pedagogical concerns." Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,273 (1988) (foot-
note omitted). But the Court acknowledged that power only because the newspaper in question
was part of a school-sponsored activity in a journalism class. Pedagogy is much more than what
goes on in a particular classroom activity. It is in the atmosphere that exists throughout the
entire school-in the hallways, at the lockers, and anywhere that students meet teachers and
each other. See Diamond, supra note 335, at 478 n.4.
354 See Marci A. Hamilton, Discussion and Decisions: A Proposal to Replace the Myth of
Self-Rule with an Attorneyship Model of Representation, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 477, 483 (1994).
355 Id. at 529 (footnote omitted).
356 Id. at 523.
357 See id. at 534.
358 Id. at 533-34.
359 Id. at 535 (footnote omitted).
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als.36 Like an attorney, a legislator's abdication of the responsibility of exer-
cising independent judgment-by refusing to vote, giving narrow interest
groups the ultimate decision or engaging in pretextual decisionmaking-is a
serious offense.361 Perhaps most important, the communication element of
the attorneyship model gives the people the ability to judge how their repre-
sentatives exercise their delegated powers and detect any abuse thereof.
362
If public schools were viewed through the lens of the attorneyship
model, we would see school officials entrusted with the delegated responsibil-
ity to act in the best pedagogical interest of present and future students while
fulfilling an obligation of continued communication with both student and
parent.363 In short, parents would delegate to school officials-teachers and
principals-the power to make independent judgments regarding "legitimate
school concerns. '364 The delegation occurs because of the hardship on par-
ents who would attempt to shoulder the entire education function-although
under recent home schooling laws they may do so if they wish-and the im-
practicability of allowing the students to make the pedagogical determina-
tions necessary to run the schools and to teach themselves. Although
parents, students, and teachers share a common interest in teaching society's
youngest members, it is the school officials who are the trustees of that com-
mon cause for a significant part of each day. They may sometimes ignore
individual voices as long as they are acting within their fiduciary duty to
make independent judgments regarding legitimate school concerns 3 65 An at-
torneyship model would leave school officials with the sort of discretion with
respect to school order that attorneys exercise with regard to legal strategy.
A comprehensive analysis of how the attorneyship model fits into the
school setting is beyond the scope of this Article. But the definition of school
power that the Court set forth in Acton may not be the best or even the
correct construct. Further study of the construct that should define the na-
ture of school power may help to resolve some of the problems inherent in
360 See id. at 536.
361 See id. at 538.
362 See id. at 540-41; cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977) (reasoning that the
"openness of the public school and its supervision by community afford significant safeguards
against" abuse).
363 Cf. Mark G. Yudof, Legalization of Dispute Resolution, Distrust of Authority, and Orga-
nizational Theory: Implementing Due Process for Students in Public Schools, 1981 Wisc. L. REv.
891, 893 (arguing that community control, rooted in expanding patterns of democratic participa-
tion, may represent still another mechanism-inconsistent with the legalization model-for con-
trolling government discretion).
364 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 526 (1969) (Harlan,
J., dissenting); see also Hafen, supra note 4, at 723 (explaining that Justice Harlan's dissent would
"discourage courts from second-guessing even 'unwise' educational judgments and would en-
courage courts to resolve questions of fact or law in favor of educational policy makers, while
still providing for protection" from extreme decisions); Note, supra note 204, at 1122 (interpret-
ing the opinion in Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978), as the Court's acceptance
of the "constraining effects that professional training will bring to the exercise of official power")
(footnote omitted).
365 See Alvin L. Goldman, The University and the Liberty of its Students: A Fiduciary The-
ory, 54 Ky. L.J. 643, 665-75 (1966) (arguing that fiduciary theory best defines the university-
student relationship).
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the Acton decision, and it is on this important issue that the scholarship
should now focus. 366
Conclusion
By defining the nature of school power, the Acton Court has taken a
step toward both practical and theoretical public school reform that may re-
sult in less court intervention in the day-to-day life of the classroom. The
Court has defined school power such that schools possess the power of a
custodian or guardian. The school power continuum, at least for Fourth
Amendment purposes, has shifted to the parent end and, if some of the lan-
guage in Acton is taken literally, may even have shifted back to in loco paren-
tis power. In its definition of school power, the Court has made plain that the
mission of the public school is social reproduction, rather than social recon-
struction. By defining the contours of school power, however, rather than
merely saying that the school has "special characteristics," the Court has
made it more difficult for a future Court, at least that purports to follow
Acton, to use the school power continuum to press the social reconstruction
agenda. And the Court certainly has signalled to the nation that it has confi-
dence in the public schools and educators to deal with yet another social
issue: the war on drugs.
Defining school power also gives principals and teachers necessary gui-
dance about the nature of the power they wield, guidance that may help alle-
viate the chilling effect that court intervention has on attempts to keep order.
Public schools-if they are to continue as an institution-simply must be al-
lowed to keep order. Studies have reinforced what many already believed-
that students simply learn better in private and parochial schools than in pub-
lic schools. 367 Most important, even after controlling for student back-
grounds, the study determined that the most significant difference between
public and private schools was the presence of a safer, more disciplined, and
more orderly learning environment.368 Recent reports also reveal that a ma-
jority of parents would send their children to a private school if they could
afford it.369 Indeed, parents and children have not flocked to public schools
366 Cf. Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REv. 2401
(1995) (exploring the notion that the "parent's legal relationship to the child is shaped by fiduci-
ary responsibilities.., rather than by inherent rights derived from status") (footnote omitted).
367 See COLEMAN ET AL, supra note 278; COLEMAN & HOFFER, supra note 278.
368 See COLEMAN ET AL, supra note 278, at 180-81; see also COLEMAN & HOFFER, supra
note 278 (pointing out that black and Hispanic children of parents with lower education levels
who attend private Catholic high schools perform significantly better than similar students in
public schools).
369 See e.g., Deborah Anderluh, Disheartened Parents Choose Private Schools, SACRA-
MENTo BEE, June 18, 1995, at Al (reporting that middle and working class parents are spending
past and future savings to avoid a public school system in which they have lost faith); Sean
Griffin & Susan Gordan, Private or Public? Two Schools of Thought, NEws TRm., June 1, 1994,
at 1 (special section) (citing a poll in two counties of Washington State in which two-thirds of the
respondents said they would prefer private school or home school education for their children if
they could afford it); Kaufman, supra note 9, at Al (citing a nationwide survey where six in ten
parents said they would send their children to private school if they could afford it). One study
showed that 59% of public school teachers with an annual family income of greater than $70,000
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because students have greater constitutional rights there than in private
schools. Many parents know that school children need an ordered environ-
ment to obtain a serious education. They will stay with public schools if an
ordered environment exists, but will leave-if they can afford to-when it
does not. As usual, the poorer children suffer the most. Poor children are
left in a system that is not working, but that will not be repaired because the
rich and the powerful have moved their children elsewhere and have no fur-
ther incentive to help the public school system.
To the extent that Acton will help the public school start to regain the
respect, deference, and trust that is so necessary to an institution that at-
tempts to inspire serious learning, it is truly a commendable opinion. For if
we are unwilling to defer to teachers when they are motivated by "legitimate
school concerns"; 370 if we are unconcerned about the lack of respect that stu-
dents show toward both public school teachers and the process of learning in
that institution; if we are unwilling to trust public school educators to imple-
ment necessary disciplinary measures so that serious learning can and will
take place, we should disband our nation's public schools and declare them a
failed experiment. That, I am certain, is not the right path to take.
sent their own children to private schools. See William Pack, Public School Teachers, Private
School Parents, SUNDAY ADVOCATE, July 23, 1995, at IA.
370 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 526 (1969) (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
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